针对由一个线上零售商和一个线下实体店构成的"线下体验+线上零售"O2O （Offline to Online）供应链，考虑线下实体店为线上零售商的产品提供线下体验服务以及实体店存在交叉销售行为，且交叉销售收益为实体店私有信息，建立了线上零售商和线下实体店之间的委托代理模型，设计了线上零售商佣金契约。进而分析了佣金契约性质，考察了不对称信息和交叉销售对线上零售商、线下实体店的影响。研究发现：线下实体店交叉销售在一定条件下能够部分替代佣金契约对实体店的激励作用，线上零售商利用实体店交叉销售策略性地设计佣金契约可以实现对实体店的不同激励目的；不对称信息的存在不一定会对O2O供应链系统造成损失或产生信息租金，线上零售商可能能够获得正的交叉销售价值，但线下实体店反而不能从其交叉销售中获得额外收益。最后，通过算例对研究结论进行了直观考察和说明。
With the rapid development of Internet technologies, more and more online retailers are exploring new ways to sell products. In this context, the "offline evaluation, online purchase" mode has been increasingly viewed as an effective and novel way to provide information of the product to the customers and this mode can mitigate information gap exists in the O2O supply chain. However, the existence of cross-selling behavior and information asymmetry leads to incentive misalignment in the offline to online (O2O) supply chain. To solve this problem, we study an offline to online (O2O) supply chain consists of an online retailer and an offline store under asymmetric cross-selling revenue information. The offline store provides consumers with offline evaluation service for the product the online retailer provides.
The main work in this paper includes four parts. First, we proposed optimal commission contracts and analyzed the properties of the optimal commission contracts under asymmetric information and full information, respectively. Second, we analyzed the impacts of cross-selling revenue information asymmetry on the optimal commission contract and the impacts on the profit of online retailer, offline store and whole O2O supply chain. Third, we established a benchmark model in which the cross-selling revenue is set to zero to investigate the value of cross-selling within an O2O supply chain, and we analyzed the impact of cross-selling revenue on the profit of online retailer and offline store. Finally, we illustrate the impacts of the environment parameters on the commission contract parameters and the profits through a numerical example.
The results show that, the online retailer will choose an optimal commission contract with both a unique commission rate and a fixed payment to effectively motivate the offline store. The optimal commission contract can motivate the offline store in different ways, since the adjustment of the fixed payment can encourage the offline store to participate in the cooperation and the adjustment of the commission rate can encourage the offline store to provide service. Meanwhile, cross-selling partially substitutes the incentive role the commission contract plays under certain conditions. But when the offline store's cross-selling revenue is high type, the cross-selling revenue will exacerbate the adverse effect of asymmetric information on fixed payment, while the low cross-selling revenue will counteract the adverse effect of asymmetric information on fixed payment. The existence of information asymmetry leads to the change of commission contract parameters. Further, the information asymmetry may not decrease the performance of O2O supply chain or generate extra information rent. Moreover, cross-selling is favorable for the online retailer under certain conditions, but not for the offline store. Practical and theoretical guidance is provided in this paper to improve the value of the offline to online supply chain.
[1] Griffis SE, Rao S, Goldsby TJ, et al. The customer consequences of returns in online retailing:An empirical analysis[J]. Journal of Operations Management, 2012, 30(4):282-294.
[2] Akçay Y, Boyac1 T, Zhang Dan. Selling with money-back guarantees:The impact on prices, quantities, and retail profitability[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22(4):777-791.
[3] 中国电子商务研究中心. 京东首涉线下"傍"新加坡iKnow探路实体店[EB/OL]. (2013-08-19)[2017-03-09]. http://b2b.toocle.com/detail-6118826.html.
[4] Marketing Week. Google opens first bricks-and-mortar shop in the UK[EB/OL]. (2015-03-11)[2017-03-09]. https://www.marketingweek.com/2015/03/11/google-opens-first-bricks-and-mortar-shop-in-the-uk/.
[5] Washington Post. From new mobile offerings to a potential off-price business, a look at whats in store for macys[EB/OL]. (2015-01-13)[2017-03-09]. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2015/01/13/from-new-mobile-offerings-to-a-potential-off-price-business-a-look-at-whats-in-store-for-macys/.
[6] UPS. UPS online shopping study:Empowered consumers changing the future of retail[EB/OL]. (2015-06-03)[2017-03-09]. https://www.pressroom.ups.com/pressroom/ContentDetailsViewer.page?ConceptType=PressReleases&id=1433180166893-264.
[7] Zhao Fuguo, Wu Desheng, Liang Liang, et al. Lateral inventory transshipment problem in online-to-offline supply chain[J]. International Journal of Production Research, 2016, 54(7):1951-1963.
[8] Gallino S, Moreno A, Stamatopoulos I. Channel integration, sales dispersion, and inventory management[J]. Management Science, 2016,63(9):2813-2831.
[9] Cao J, So KC, Yin Shuya. Impact of an "online-to-store" channel on demand allocation, pricing and profitability[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, 248(1):234-245.
[10] 刘伟, 徐鹏涛. O2O电商平台在线点评有用性影响因素的识别研究——以餐饮行业O2O模式为例[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(5):168-176.
[11] 吴晓志, 陈宏, 张俊. 考虑在线补贴的零售商水平O2O供应链协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(S1):479-484.
[12] 张应语, 张梦佳, 王强, 等. 基于感知收益-感知风险框架的O2O模式下生鲜农产品购买意愿研究[J]. 中国软科学, 2015,(6):128-138.
[13] Chen Xu, Wang Xiaojun, Jiang Xinkuang. The impact of power structure on the retail service supply chain with an O2O mixed channel[J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2016, 67(2):294-301.
[14] Bell DR, Gallino S, Moreno A. How to win in an omnichannel world[J]. MIT Sloan Management Review, 2014, 56(1):44-53.
[15] Chopra S. How omni-channel can be the future of retailing[J]. Decision, 2016, 43(2):135-144.
[16] Bell DR, Gallino S, Moreno A. Showrooms and information provision in omni-channel retail[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(3):360-362.
[17] Bell DR, Gallino S, Moreno A. Offline showrooms and customer migration in omnichannel retail[DB]. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, 2015.
[18] Gao Fei, Su Xuanming. Online and offline information for omnichannel retailing[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2017, 19(1):84-98.
[19] Gallino S, Moreno A. Integration of online and offline channels in retail:The impact of sharing reliable inventory availability information[J]. Management Science, 2014, 60(6):1434-1451.
[20] Gao Fei, Su Xuanming. Omnichannel retail operations with buy-online-and-pick-up-in-store[J]. Management Science, 2016,63(8):2478-2492.
[21] Gu Zheyin, Liu Yunchuan. Consumer fit search, retailer shelf layout, and channel interaction[J]. Marketing Science, 2013, 32(4):652-668.
[22] Balakrishnan A, Sundaresan S, Zhang Bo. Browse-and-switch:retail-online competition under value uncertainty[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2014, 23(7):1129-1145.
[23] Gu Zhenyin, Tayi GK. Consumer mending and online retailer fit-uncertainty mitigating strategies[J]. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 2015, 13(3):251-282.
[24] 黄宗盛, 聂佳佳, 赵映雪. 基于消费者满意的双渠道销售商退款保证策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(2):61-68.
[25] Chen Fangruo. Salesforce incentives, market information, and production/inventory planning[J]. Management Science, 2005, 51(1):60-75.
[26] 田厚平, 刘长贤. 双重信息不对称下销售渠道双目标混合激励模型[J]. 管理科学学报, 2011, 14(3):34-47.
[27] Huang He, Shen Xiaoyu, Xu Hongyan. Procurement contracts in the presence of endogenous disruption risk[J]. Decision Sciences, 2016, 47(3):437-472.
[28] 汪峻萍, 杨剑波, 贾兆丽. 基于无缺陷退货的网上销售易逝品供应链协调模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(6):47-56.
