为了研究供应链赊销交易中知情委托方向代理方进行信号显示的问题，考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链，双方进行赊销交易。零售商作为核心企业，拥有销售能力的私人信息。基于显示原理，首先设计了具有激励性质且保证供应商单独可获利的低信息密度最优配置，并分析了博弈的完美贝叶斯均衡。结果表明，知情零售商通过提供低信息密度最优配置向供应商传递信号，但存在信号成本，具体表现为：契约呈现"低端不扭曲，高端向上扭曲"特性；且对高能力零售商的初始资金有门槛要求。其次，通过分析知情零售商提供的事中有效配置发现，当供应商对零售商所属类型的信念满足一定条件时，低信息密度最优是事中有效的，此时博弈存在唯一的完美贝叶斯均衡。否则，由事中有效确定的均衡配置集弱帕累托占优于低信息密度最优；高能力零售商的信号传递成本相对降低，具体表现为："高端向上扭曲"的程度相对较低，且向供应商提供初始资金的门槛要求也更低。本文的研究对供应链管理中，知情委托方的赊销契约设计问题提供了一定的理论基础和实践指导。
Mechanism design by an informed principal needs to take into account the informational leakage taking place when offering a contract to the agent. In this paper, the problem of contract design by an informed principal under trade credit in supply chain is investigated. More specifically, a supply chain consisting of a risk-neural supplier and a risk-neural retailer is considered. As the core enterprise, the retailer finances the inventory using trade credit from the supplier. By the Revelation Principle, we design the low-information-intensity optimum allocation (LⅡ) with incentive compatibility is designed, to realize the informational leakage to the supplier, and avoid the imitation between different types of retailers. By means of the mechanism way of deriving the equilibrium applied by Tirole, it is found that under the weak monotonic profit assumption, the separating allocation is the LⅡ. It's also shown that to sign the true type to the supplier, the optimal contracts for the retailer with higher ability entails an upward distortion, which causes signaling cost. And the degree of distortion decreases with the increase of the retailer's initial capital. Meanwhile, the contracts have restrictions of the initial capital. Furthermore, the interim-efficient allocation (IE) is presented to analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. It can be shown that the LⅡ is the unique PBE for certain supplier's ax ante belief. Otherwise, the set of equilibrium payoffs for the two types of retailers weakly Pareto-dominate the LⅡ. And the (IE) still present the same distorted characteristic as the LⅡ, but has lower restrictions on the retailer's initial capital. Our research will provide some theoretical basis and practical guidance for the mechanism design by an informed principal under trade credit in supply chain.
[1] Goyal S K. Economic order quantity under conditions of permissible delay in payments[J]. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 1988, 39(3):322-323.
[2] Chen S C, Teng J T. Retailer's economic order quantity when the supplier offers conditionally permissible delay in payments link to order quantity[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 155:284-291.
[3] 秦娟娟. 时变供需下基于商业信用的零售商最优订货策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(3):89-98.
[4] Lee C H, Rhee B D. Coordination contracts in the presence of positive inventory financing costs[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2010, 124(2):331-339.
[5] Lee C H, Rhee B D. Trade credit for supply chain coordination[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2011, 214(1):136-146.
[6] Chen Xiangfeng, Wang Anyu. Trade credit contract with limited liability in the supply chain with budget constraints[J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2012, 196(1):153-165.
[7] 张义刚, 唐小我. 延迟支付下短生命周期产品批发价契约研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2011, 19(3):63-69.
[8] 刚号, 唐小我, 慕银平. 零售商主导下融资服务对采购合同的影响[J]. 系统工程, 2013, 31(4):32-36.
[9] Mahata G C, Mahata P. Analysis of a fuzzy economic order quantity model for deteriorating items under retailer partial trade credit financing in a supply chain[J]. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 2011, 53(9):1621-1636.
[10] Chen Fangruo. Auctioning supply contracts[J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(10):1562-1576.
[11] Özer, Raz G. Supply chain sourcing under asymmetric information[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2011, 20(1):92-115.
[12] Cakanyildirim M, Feng Qi, Gan Xianghua, et al. Contracting and coordination under asymmetric production cost information[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2012, 21(2):345-360.
[13] Wang J C, Lau H S, Lau A H L. When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2009, 197(1):266-286.
[14] Wang J C, Lau A H L, Lau H S. Practical and effective contracts for the dominant retailer of a newsvendor product with price-sensitive demand[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2012, 138(1):46-54.
[15] 徐晓燕,吴三平. 生产成本信息不对称的两级供应链协调研究[J]. 系统工程学报,2009, 24(1):18-24.
[16] 曹二保,赖明勇. 信息不对称的委托销售合约[J]. 系统管理学报, 2009, 18(2):199-202.
[17] 颜波, 刘艳萍, 李鸿媛. 成本信息不对称下零售商主导的混合渠道供应链决策分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(12):124-134.
[18] Maskin E, Tirole J. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal:The case of private values[J]. Econometrica,1990, 58(2):379-409.
[19] Maskin E, Tirole J. The principal-agent relationship with an informed principal, Ⅱ:Common values[J]. Econometrica, 1992, 60(1):1-42.
[20] 鄢仁秀, 汪贤裕. 非对称信息下供应链赊销交易中的最优契约机制[J].软科学, 2014, 28(12):16-49, 94.
[21] Perakis G, Roels G. Regret in the newsvendor model with partial information[J]. Operations Research, 2008, 56(1):188-203.
[22] Tirole J. The theory of corporate finance[M]. Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2010.
