金属矿产开发是涉及各个利益主体矛盾冲突及生态安全的复杂社会系统工程,而生态补偿是协调各方利益均衡和保障生态安全的有效的制度解,基于该背景本文在矿产资源领域生态文明体制构建条件下,探究金属矿产开发生态补偿利益均衡问题。即基于金属矿产开发过程中涉及的中央政府、地方政府、当地企业和当地居民利益主体的复杂利益诉求,在考虑社会强互惠群体存在的基础下,运用演化博弈论的方法分析关联主体在博弈过程中的利益均衡及补偿策略动态演化过程,得出为达到社会所期望的均衡结果所需的条件。为了验证该均衡所需的条件,以存在复杂利益诉求的典型的德兴铜矿为案例展开实证分析,即运用生态价值当量法、修正的人力资本法、医疗费用法、市场价值法、替代法、机会成本法、影子价格法和现代空间信息技术对相关参数估值和使用统计数据进行数据测算,并将得到的数值用Matlab软件进行数值模拟,比较分析德兴铜矿各利益主体的真实均衡与期望均衡的一致性结果。针对此结果与达到均衡的条件提出相应的生态补偿对策,进一步验证本文提出的模型与生态补偿利益主体的均衡条件是具有普适性和扩展意义的。
The exploitation of metal mineral resources is a complex and socially systematic project involving conflicts of the interests of all parties and ecological security. Ecological compensation is an effective system to coordinate the interests of all parties and to ensure the ecological security.Based on this background,the balance of interests of ecological compensation under the condition of the construction of ecological civilization system in the field of mineral resourcesis is analyzed.The interest equilibrium and dynamic evolutionary process of the central government,local government,local enterprises and local residents is analyzed by using the game theory in the exploitation of metal mineral resources.In addition to taking into account the complex interest demands of the interests and the existence of the strong reciprocity group,the conditions which are needed to achieve the desired equilibrium results are reached. The following conclusions are drawn through the analysis of the conditions.The strategy choice of the game between central government and local government is affected by the revenues,the cost of compensation,the financial transfer payment,the punishment dynamics,and the strong reciprocity behavior.The strategy choice of the game between local government and local enterprises is affected by the revenues,supervision costs,taxes and fees,fines,governance costs and government incentives.The strategy choice of the game between local enterprises and local residents is affected by revenues,compensation costs,cost of resistance and government incentives. And on this basis,in order to verify the conditions needed for the equilibrium,the Dexing copper mine which is a typical case of the complex interest demands is analyzed. In this process,not only the value of relevant parameters is estimated by using the ecological value equivalent method,corrected human capital method,cost of illness method,market value method,substitution method,opportunity cost method,shadow price method and modern space information technology,but also the data is calculated by using statistical data. After numerical simulation is carried out with MATLAB software,the consistency between the real equilibrium and the expected equilibrium is analyzed. Further more it is verified that the model and the equalization result is universal and extensible.Moreover,the corresponding counter measures of ecological compensation are out forward. It also provides a new thoughts and analysis theoretical framework to solve the problem of the balance of interests of ecological compensation in the field of mineral resources.
[1] 胡锦涛.坚定不移沿着中国特色社会主义道路前进为全面建成小康社会而奋斗-在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上的报告[R/OL].[2012-11-18]. http://www.gmw.cn/sixiang/2012-11/18/content_5725672_3.htm.
[2] 中华人民共和国国土资源部. 全国矿产资源规划(2016-2020年)[EB/OL].[2016-12-5].http://www.mlr.gov.cn/xwdt/kyxw/201612/t20161201_1423090.htm.
[3] Pegg S.Mining and poverty reduction:Transforming rhetoric into reality[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2006,14(3-4):376-387.
[4] Dong Shidi,Roger B,Qian Wei. Salient stakeholders in corporate social responsibility reporting by Chinese mining and minerals companies[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2014,84:59-69.
[5] 李惠梅,张安录.基于福祉视角的生态补偿研究[J].生态学报,2013,33(4):1065-1070.
[6] 鲁迪,于长立.煤矿塌陷区土地复垦与生态补偿优化设计[J].生态经济,2008,(8):99-102.
[7] 王立安,钟方雷.苏芳.西部生态补偿与缓解贫困关系的研究框架[J].经济地理,2009,29(9):1552-1557.
[8] 赵雪雁.生态补偿效率研究综述.生态学报,2012,32(6):1960-1969.
[9] 刘德海.群体性突发事件中政府机会主义行为的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(1):175-183.
[10] 郑君君,闫龙,张好雨,等.基于演化博弈和优化理论的环境污染群体性事件处置机制[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(8):168-176.
[11] 潘峰,西宝,王琳.基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,(6):1393-1404.
[12] 黄健柏,王叶,钟美瑞,等.代际视角下矿产资源开发补偿的组合性均衡评价模型[J].预测,2014,33(5):71-80.
[13] 钟美瑞,胡小雪,黄健柏,等.基于组合性均衡评价模型的矿产资源开发补偿定价公平性分析[J].经济地理,2015,35(4):162-168.
[14] 胡振华,刘景月,钟美瑞,等.基于演化博弈的跨界流域生态补偿利益均衡分析-以漓江流域为例[J].经济地理,2016,36(6):42-49.
[15] 徐大伟,涂少云,常亮,等.基于演化博弈的流域生态补偿利益冲突分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2012,22(2):8-14.
[16] 张伟,张金锁,刘杰.基于演化博弈的煤炭资源绿色开采监管策略研究[J].西安科技大学学报,2016,36(3):349-355.
[17] 杨从明,朱海彬,任晓冬.基于Shapley值法的矿产资源开发利益相关者利益分配博弈分析[J].地球与环境,2014,42(3):424-429.
[18] 程倩,张霞.矿产资源开发的生态补偿及各方利益博弈研究[J].矿业研究与开发,2014,34(3):127-131.
[19] 张倩.基于演化博弈视角的矿产资源开发生态补偿问题研究[J].资源开发与市场,2016,32(2):165-169.
[20] 李春雪,刘春学. 新常态下的矿产资源开发利益博弈[J].中国矿业,2015,24(2):36-39.
[21] 戴茂华. 中国稀有金属矿产资源开发的生态补偿机制和政策研究[J]. 生态经济,2013,(10):134-137.
[22] 伏润民,缪小林. 中国生态功能区财政转移支付制度体系重构-基于拓展的能值模型衡量的生态外溢价值[J].经济研究,2015,50(3):47-61.
[23] 彭秀丽,刘凌霄,田铭.基于综合损失补偿法的矿产开发生态补偿标准研究-以湘西州花垣县锰矿为例[J].中央财经大学学报,2012,(12):59-64.
[24] 曾先峰.资源环境产权缺陷与矿区生态补偿机制缺失:影响机理分析[J].干旱区资源与环境,2014,28(5):47-52.
[25] 王慧敏,于荣,牛文娟.基于强互惠理论的漳河流域跨界水资源冲突水量协调方案设计[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(8):2170-2178.
[26] 刘春腊,刘卫东,徐美.基于生态价值当量的中国省域生态补偿额度研究[J].资源科学,2014,36(1):148-155.
[27] 於方,过孝民,张衍燊,等.2004年中国大气污染造成的健康经济损失评估[J].环境与健康杂志,2007,24(12):999-1003.
[28] 廖合群,金姝兰.德兴铜矿开采环境代价分析[J].价格月刊,2013,(12):92-94.
[29] 金姝兰,金威,徐磊,等.基于耕地价值的江西省征地补偿标准测算[J].湖北农业科学,2011,50(15):3054-3057.
[30] 刘蓓.促进生态文明建设的西部地方政府绩效评价指标体系研究-以广西为例[J].学术论坛,2014,(1):31-35.