应急需求的不确定性和紧迫性为政企联合下的物资采购管理带来巨大挑战，单一的补贴形式和固定的补贴水平已难以维持供应商的收益和合作意愿。对此，本研究针对非常规突发事件发生时期极易上涨的市场价格，对被采购物资实行价差补贴，同时考虑到需求数量不确定将会导致政府实际采购量偏离预订量，进而对未被采购物资实行剩余物资补贴，即构建了一个基于基准支付和两种柔性补贴的价格柔性契约。运用Stackelberg博弈推导证明了价格柔性契约可实现应急物资供应链协调，且政府作为采购主导方，可通过调整基准价格水平分配系统节约成本。数值计算和敏感度分析进一步验证了契约的有效性和灵活性。
Physical reserves with the shortest response time plays an important role in emergency situation to meet the urgent and huge demand, especially when sudden-onset disasters happen. As the entity who takes the responsibility of dealing with emergencies, the government must ensure abundant supplies are reserved in advance. Cooperation with supplier is necessary for the government to expand the holding capacity and to reduce costs.
Contracts are widely used in commercial supply chain, but less popular in humanitarian supply chain because of the uncertain demands and complex situations. The contract form and factors to consider should adapt to unique characteristics of emergency situations. On one hand, when disasters happen, the market prices of necessary products are likely to increase. A moderately increased price is reasonable because of the high demand and rising costs. A recently published consultation paper also illustrates the legitimacy of slightly increased market prices. Therefore, for the purchased supplies under emergency situations,the rising market price should be considered to protect the supplier's profit and firm the government-supplier cooperation. Meanwhile, considering the uncertainty of demand quantity, subsidizing the contracted but unpurchased supplies is also necessary to cover the supplier's costs of production, holding, et al.
In a contract, participants' goals and interests tend to be different, and then a game will exist. Since the emergency procurement is a buyer-led market, a government-led Stackelberg game is established in this paper. Considering the unique characteristics of emergency situation, a price flexibility contract is constructed, which consists of a basic payment, a price difference subsidy and a subsidy for unpurchased supplies. Through deduction and numerical calculation, it is proved and confirmed that the supply chain is coordinated under the price flexibility contract. Profits (saving costs) can be distributed between the government and the supplier by adjusting the basic payment. Besides, at a basic payment level, arbitrary combination of the price difference subsidy and unpurchased supplies subsidy increases the flexibility of contract's implementation.
In this research, the abrupt market price's influence on participants' decisions is emphasized and proved by introducing price difference subsidy, and also its importance to the contract's feasibility and flexibility is demonstrated. In general, contributions are made to the literature on emergency supplies procurement management and contract theory, and assistace for the government is provided to decide how to cooperate with suppliers in reality for emergency purpose.
[1] 汪鑫文. 大型冰雪灾害给区域应急物资采购带来的思考[J]. 中国政府采购, 2009,(1):42-43.
[2] 苏星, 伍敏. 印度洋海啸紧急救灾采购对建立完善我军物资应急采购机制的启示[J]. 中国政府采购, 2005,(8):10-12.
[3] 张红. 我国应急物资储备制度的完善[J]. 中国行政管理, 2009,(3):44-47.
[4] 马新, 陈涛, 黄钧. 建立全社会应急物资储备体系的若干重要问题[J]. 工程研究:跨学科视野中的工程, 2011,3(1):82-86.
[5] 丁斌, 刘松林. 基于期权合约的应急物资采购定价策略研究[J]. 北京理工大学学报:社会科学版, 2010,12(6):78-81.
[6] 丁斌, 陈锦锦. 基于期权合约的应急物资采购定价模型研究[J]. 华东理工大学学报:社会科学版, 2010,(4):54-59.
[7] 王熹徽, 梁樑. 救灾供应链采购策略及契约协调机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013,21(4):62-73.
[8] Liang Liang, Wang Xihui, Gao Jianguo. An option contract pricing model of relief material supply chain[J]. Omega, 2012, 40(5):594-600.
[9] Wang Xihui, Wu Yunfei, Liang Liang, et al. Service outsourcing and disaster response methods in a relief supply chain[J]. Annals of Operations Research, 2016,240(2):471-487.
[10] Wang Xihui, Li Feng, Liang Liang, et al. Pre-purchasing with option contract and coordination in a relief supply chain[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 167:170-176.
[11] 张海青, 田军. 采购方主导的基于能力期权契约的应急物资采购模型[J].系统科学与数学, 2011, 31(10):1317-1327.
[12] 田军, 张海青, 汪应洛. 基于能力期权契约的双源应急物资采购模型[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(9):2212-2219.
[13] 田军, 葛永玲, 侯丛丛. 政府主导的基于实物期权契约的应急物资采购模型[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2014, 34(10):2582-2590.
[14] 张琳,田军,杨瑞娜,等. 数量柔性契约中的应急物资采购定价策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(10):2590-2600.
[15] Tsay A A. The quantity flexibility contract and supplier-customer incentives[J].Management Science, 1999, 45(10):1339-1358.
[16] Tsay A A, Lovejoy W S. Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance[J].Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 1999, 1(2):89-111.
[17] Tsay A A, Nahmias S, Agrawal N. Modeling supply chain contracts:A review[M]//Tayur S,Ganeshcon R,Magazine M.Quantitative models for supply chain management.New York:Kluwer Academic Publishers,1999:299-336.
[18] Barnes-Schuster D, Bassok Y, Anupindi R. Coordination and flexibility in supply contracts with options[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2002, 4(3):171-207.
[19] Sethi S P, Yan H, Zhang H. Quantity flexibility contracts:optimal decisions with information updates[J]. Decision Sciences, 2004, 35(4):691-712.
[20] Kanda A, Deshmukh S G. A framework for evaluation of coordination by contracts:A case of two-level supply chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2009, 56(4):1177-1191.
[21] Govindan K, Diabat A, Popiuc M N. Contract analysis:A performance measures and profit evaluation within two-echelon supply chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2012, 63(1):58-74.
[22] Li C L, Kouvelis P. Flexible and risk-sharing supply contracts under price uncertainty[J]. Management Science, 1999, 45(10):1378-1398.
[23] Gao Youyang. Sign risk-sharing contract with contract manufacturing organizations in pharmaceutical industry[D]. The Pennsylvania State University, 2014.
[24] 慕银平, 刘利明. 价格柔性合同下的原材料采购策略及风险分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015,23(3):108-117.
[25] 慕银平, 刘利明. 采购价格柔性策略与供应链利润风险分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(11):80-87.
[26] 刘浪, 史文强, 冯良清. 多因素扰动情景下应急数量弹性契约的供应链协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(7):163-176.
[27] Wang Xiaolong, Liu Liwen. Coordination in a retailer-led supply chain through option contract[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2007, 110(1):115-127.
[28] Natarajan K V, Swaminathan J M. Inventory management in humanitarian operations:Impact of amount, schedule, and uncertainty in funding[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2014, 16(4):595-603.
[29] 陈业华, 史开菊. 突发事件灾前应急物资政企联合储备模式[J]. 系统工程, 2014, 32(2):84-90.
[30] 丁斌, 邹月月. 基于政企联合储备模式下的应急物资的EOQ模型[J]. 大连理工大学学报:社会科学版, 2012,33(1):90-94.
