跨国供应链的隐性利益输送正成为研究的热点之一。本文基于跨国公司以供应链方式在全球范围内整合资源的基础上，分析了跨国供应链在海内外两市场间的跨链合作框架，探讨了跨国供应间的隐性利益输送的前提条件。在此背景下，通过引入转移定价（TP，Transfer Pricing），建立海内外两单链无横向合作和有横向合作的跨国供应链隐性利益输送的决策模型，然后，设计出在考虑隐性利益输送下的单TP模式和双TP模式；并进一步，针对上述两种模型下探讨了不同TP模式组合策略和实施条件；最后对模型进行优化求解，以及对不同TP模式策略下进行了敏感性分析，发现不同国家所得税的差异对通过转移定价来实现隐性利益转移起到很大作用，而且在单TP模式下，由于触发机理简单，更容易被监管和识别，需配合成本增减，来实现隐性利益输送；在双TP模式下，两转移价格反向变化比同向变化，来进行利益转移更为隐蔽，且在横向合作下隐形利益输送形成的利润率高于由于需求增加所带来的利润率。
With the development of global economy, the multinationals search for relevant resources worldwide and optimize its supply chain. Domestic companies, due to increase in labor cost and fierce competition, are forced to invest overseas and establish the factories, and shape its own supply chain network system through integrating domestic and oversea market. In this way, domestic companies ease competition press and sharp the advantages through allocating resources worldwide. Beyond profit from market demand, another unique profit channel for multinational is from interest delivery via transfer price. Up to now, while existing literatures focus on transfer pricing policy and its effect under a single supply chain scenario, there is still a lack of understanding of how hidden interest delivery is conducted under supply chain networks including local chain and oversea chain. In this paper, based on the literature from fields of global supply chain and transfer price, a framework of across-chain cooperation in domestic and overseas markets is developed, and the precondition of hidden interest deliver by multinational supply chain is explored. Then, through introducing Transfer Pricing (TP), decision-making models of delivering hidden interest without and with horizontal cooperation for multinational supply chain are established. Then the single TP and duel TP modes are designed. What's more, the relevant tactics and conditions of different TP modes are studied. Finally, the models is optimized, and the sensitive analysis under different TP modes is conducted. It is found that corporate income tax is playing an important role in hidden interest deliver via transfer pricing. Meanwhile, in the setting of single TP, due to simple trigger mechanism, multinational supply chain hidden interest delivery is more prone to be supervised and identified, it is normal to apply it into practice combined with variety of cost. In the setting of duel TP, it is more elusive for two transfer prices changed with diverse direction to delivery interest than with the same directions. In addition, profit rate from hidden interest delivery is higher than that from increasing demand in the context of horizontal cooperation.
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