In the era of rapid development of mobile electronics and high convenience of mobile payment, Online To Offline(O2O) business mode is increasingly becoming the important direction of transformation and upgrading for the industries of traditional retail, e-commerce and even express logistics, affecting the supply chain operations and its optimization decisions. Strategic consumer behavior under the Online-to-Offline (O2O) mode is different from the traditional mode, and its impact on supply chain operations management and optimization decisions is also different from the traditional mode. Based on the characteristics of O2O mode, using theories of strategic consumer behavior and supply chain optimization and coordination, centralized decision and contract coordination models for supply chain considering the strategy consumer behavior under the O2O mode 1 of ‘online order +offline experience+ offline payment+ self-delivery’, the O2O mode 2 of ‘online browsing +offline experience+ online payment+ offline delivery’, the offline mode and the online mode are developed and analyzed respectively, and the corresponding numerical analysis is implemented, on this basis, the management insights are summarized in this paper. The results show that:(1) Whether under the O2O mode 1 of ‘online order +offline experience+ offline payment+ self-delivery’ or under the O2O mode 2 of ‘online browsing +offline experience+ online payment+ offline delivery’, whether under the online mode or under the offline mode, a revenue sharing contract mechanism can effectively achieve the supply chain coordination under the strategic customer behavior. (2) Comparing two types of O2O mode with two-types of non-O2O mode, it is showed that O2O mode 1 and O2O mode 2 can bring more profit to the supply chain and its members, while pure online mode and pure offline mode can bring higher utility to strategic customers. (3) Setting higher subsidies and lower discount prices under the O2O mode is beneficial for improving the operations performance of the supply chain and its members. (4) Improving the utility from the actual experience of product and the corresponding service under the O2O mode, is beneficial for improving the operations performance of the supply chain and its members, and also is beneficial for improving the net utility of strategic customers. This research has strong academic value and innovation significance on the area of the impact of strategic consumer behavior on the supply chain coordination under the O2O mode, and provides theoretical support and decision-making reference for supply chain decision-makers correctly understanding the strategic consumer behavior under the O2O mode and making the right decisions.
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