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论文

需求率受推广努力水平影响的新能源汽车租赁系统协调契约

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  • 昆明理工大学管理与经济学院, 云南 昆明 650093

收稿日期: 2016-11-09

  修回日期: 2017-07-11

  网络出版日期: 2018-05-24

基金资助

国家自然科学基金资助项目(71461014,71362025)

Coordination Contract for Green Car Rental System with Promotion Effort Dependent Demand Rate

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  • Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650093, China

Received date: 2016-11-09

  Revised date: 2017-07-11

  Online published: 2018-05-24

摘要

考虑由新能源汽车租赁企业和政府组成的二级系统,在需求率为随机且与推广努力水平相关的市场环境下,建立了新能源汽车租赁企业和政府之间的博弈模型,探讨了分散决策、集中决策、收益共享与成本共担契约下的最优车队配置和推广努力水平,并对三种情形下的最优决策进行了比较和分析。研究结果表明:在分散决策情况下无法实现系统协调,通过引入成本共担与收益共享组合契约,当契约参数满足一定条件时,该组合契约模型不仅可以实现系统协调而且可以使系统成员达到帕累托改进。最后通过算例分析,验证了模型了可靠性和有效性。

本文引用格式

经有国, 郭培强, 秦开大 . 需求率受推广努力水平影响的新能源汽车租赁系统协调契约[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018 , 26(3) : 94 -100 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.03.010

Abstract

With the increasing awareness of environmental protection, the green travel is getting more and more attention. However, in terms of the green car rental, there are few studies on the cooperation mechanism between the green car rental company and the city government. Therefore, this paper will study the relationship between them by applying the supply chain coordination contract theory.
Firstly, considering a two-echelon system which is composed of a green car rental company and a government, the game model between them is built with the assumptions that the demand rate is random and depends on the government's promotion efforts. Secondly, the optimal decisions of fleet sizing and promotion effort level under the decentralized decision, the centralized decision and a combined contract based on revenue sharing and cost sharing are researched respectively, and a comparative analysis is carried out. Finally, the example analysis is employed to verify the reliability and validity of the above models.
The following results is attained:the system can't achieve coordination under the decentralized decision; the introduced combined contract of revenue sharing and cost sharing can not only achieve system coordination but also make the members of the system achieve Pareto improvement when the contract parameters satisfy certain conditions. The example analysis illustrates that the two parties can achieve the integrated optimal profit only through cooperation. the proposed cooperation mechanism between the green car rental company and the city governmentcan provide an innovative theoretical basis for further related researchs.

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