在P2P网络借贷契约中，提供了一种关于随机借款需求的两阶段关闭式降价拍卖，并构成了借款人的一个最优机制。对此，首先设计借贷契约以确定初始借款需求；随后以事前对称贷款人为基准建立相应的拍卖模型，并进行一次标准的关闭式降价拍卖，再从中标贷款人中获得一个额外的借款需求；最后将这个机制拓展到事前非对称贷款人的情形，以分析非对称情形下的拍卖过程，并通过算例加以说明。这个机制对借款人是最优的，而且借款人和贷款人都比较熟悉这种简单拍卖，因此可以用于改进中国P2P网络借贷市场的交易机制。
Auctions are common in everyday life and have penetrated into all areas of online markets, including supply chain procurement, resource allocation, and online e-commerce transactions. In recent years, the auction theory has also been extended to online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending markets for analyzing the interests of lenders and borrower. However, many related researches on online P2P lending markets of China mainly focuse on risk control, behavior decision, trust and supervision. Fewer literatures explore China's online P2P lending trading mechanisms through the auction theory. Therefore, the existing deficiencies of trading mechanisms of China's online P2P lending markets are mainly analyzed, and the current trading mechanisms are improved through the auction theory. In this process, a lending contract is first set up to determine the initial loan demand, then two open-descending closed auction mechanisms on online P2P lending markets are designed, which include pre-symmetric and asymmetric auction models. This paper shows that a variation of the standard open-descending auction is an optimal mechanism for the borrower. These two mechanisms will consist of two stages (both take place before the borrower's demand realizes). In Stage 1, the borrower will run a standard open-descending auction for an initial fixed quantity. In Stage 2, the winning lenders from Stage 1 will receive one additional offer from the borrower to supply more units at unit prices no higher than the auction's ending price. Results show that these two mechanisms are optimal for borrower; and borrower and lenders are more familiar with these simple auctions. Therefore, it can be used to improve China's trading mechanisms of online P2P lending markets. Results of examples analysis also show that, as long as trading mechanisms of online P2P lending markets can be normally operated, these two open-descending closed auction mechanisms can further reduce the borrower's payment cost. And these mechanisms can be an effective improvement scheme compared with the trading mechanism provided by China's existing auction platform, which is conducive to the healthy development of China's P2P lending markets.
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