优序融资理论从企业价值和资本成本的角度指出企业融资应遵循内源融资、债权融资和股权融资的顺序。当企业的融资与运营相结合时，成长型企业的融资方式选择与优序融资理论有何异同?文章构建了供应链视角下成长型零售商的债权和股权融资模型，探讨其在快速发展过程中的最优融资方式。核心的发现是：供应链合作、企业的成长性和估值水平均会影响企业的融资方式选择。在供应链不合作下，被高估的零售商以及被低估的高成长性零售商应选择股权融资，被低估的中或低成长性零售商应遵循优序融资理论选择债权融资；在供应链合作下，零售商的市场成长性主导了其融资方式，估值水平仅对部分中等成长性零售商的融资方式产生影响。
Debt financing, which was once the main financing choice of growth enterprise, is gradually and partly replaced by equity financing due to the rapid development of equity financing and the difficulties and high cost of debt financing. However, there is no consensus on the optimal financing choice when growth enterprise raises fund for its new project. From the perspective of firm value and capital cost,the pecking order theory shows that firms tend to choose internal financing and prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. Does it still hold true for growth enterprise considering the combination of financing and operation management? Present study considers a risk neutral retailer facing good market opportunity employs debt or equity financing to exploit the market, after which its demand function becomes D=a-bp+βe, where β and e represent its growth and effort, respectively.The financing amount B depends on the ordering cost and effort cost, and is used to meet the capital needs of supply chain operation. In debt financing, the rate is fixed to r, and the financing amount is limited by λA, where λ is mortgage rate and A is the fixed asset of retailer. This limitation does not exist in equity financing, where P/B method (the P/B ratio is set to α) is adopted to determine the valuation of grow enterprise with own fund η and fixed asset A. Thus, the valuation of enterprise is α(A+η), and the stock share of the retailer changes to (α(A+η))/(α(A+η)+B). Based on these, the debt and equity financing models under the supply chain management for a growth retailer are construeted, and its optimal financing choice via comparing the retailer's maximum profits under the optimal operation and financing decisions between debt and equity financing is investigated. Additionally, a numerical simulation which is partly based on the data of Chinese stock market is also present to clearly reveal the financing choice. The key finding is that the optimal financing choice is affected by supply chain cooperation, firm growth and valuation. Without the supply chain cooperation, the undervalued retailer with high growth or the overvalued one prefers equity to debt, but the undervalued one with low or medium growth follows the pecking order theory. However, the financing choice of retailer is dominated by its growth under supply chain cooperation. Firm valuation only works in the financing choice of the retailer with medium growth. These differences between the cases with and without supply chain cooperation stem from the dominant right of the supplier. Our results contribute to the financing decision of growth enterprise and the exploration of the interaction between operation and financing, and also provide insight into the model research of equity financing from the perspective of supply chain.
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