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论文

互补型闭环供应链的收益共享与成本共担契约协调优化

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  • 1. 上海财经大学商学院, 上海 200433;
    2. 上海对外经贸大学会展与旅游学院, 上海 201620;
    3. 新疆财经大学工商管理学院, 乌鲁木齐 830012
梁玲(1978-),女(汉族),四川资阳人,上海对外经贸大学,讲师,硕士生导师,研究方向:服务运营管理、供应链契约,E-mail:liang-ling@foxmail.com.

收稿日期: 2016-10-18

  修回日期: 2017-05-10

  网络出版日期: 2018-10-22

基金资助

国家社会科学基金重大项目(15ZDB161);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272015)

Contract Coordination and Optimization of Revenue-sharing and Cost-sharing Incomplementary Closed-loop Supply Chain

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  • 1. Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China;
    2. Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620, China;
    3. Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, Urmuqi 830012, China

Received date: 2016-10-18

  Revised date: 2017-05-10

  Online published: 2018-10-22

摘要

互联网平台开放、协作和分享的特点改变了传统的商业模式。如何将互联网思维与传统产业相融合,理论界和实业界正在进行理论探索和模式实践,突破线上平台商和线下渠道服务商界限以提高服务效率,解决线上平台服务和逆向回收难的瓶颈。本文针对单一线上平台商-单一线下渠道服务商的闭环供应链系统,探讨双方如何在正向供应链进行收益共享、逆向供应链进行渠道成本分担情境下的产品定价和服务优化决策。通过对比收益共享模型和收益共享-成本共担模型发现,线上平台商将部分收益分给线下服务商的同时,如果能分担线下渠道服务建设投入,将更有利于逆向回收和服务商逆向渠道服务水平的提高。最后,还通过数值分析,验证了分成分担比例对平台商和服务商决策的影响,以及对各决策变量的影响关系机理。

本文引用格式

谢家平, 梁玲, 杨光, 孔凡玉, 陈玉萍 . 互补型闭环供应链的收益共享与成本共担契约协调优化[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018 , 26(8) : 94 -105 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.08.010

Abstract

In the era of IoT, the E-commerce mode not only saves the channel cost of manufacturers, but allows them acquire demand data from information sharing platform. In this way manufacturers adjust prices efficiently and affect the customers' purchasing strategies. However, to encourage customers change their traditional offline purchasing preferences, the online prices given by the manufacturers are usually lower than that of offline retailers which leads to an online-offline channel conflict. IKEA and Apple are the first companies trying to discover another types of E-commerce mode in which customers order online and pick up offline. Such a channel complementary business mode integrates online and offline channel and brings manufacturers more precise market demand prediction. Meanwhile, the offline dispatching service allows customers pick up the products more conveniently which promotes the satisfaction of customers.
A two-echelon closed-loop dual channel supply chain consisting of single online direct selling platform provider and single offline channel service provider is studied in the present paper. The platform provider in the forward channel takes charge of product manufacturing, remanufacturing, online direct selling, order receiving and passing the orders to offline channel service provider who takes charge of product distribution, instruction, maintenance, experience and return. The offline service provider in the reverse channel takes charge of recycling used product. They retrieve used product from customers in a certain price and are compensated by online platform provider. In the forward channel, online platform provider and offline channel service provider share their revenue of selling in the forward channel. In this scenario the optimal direct selling price, transfer payment, recycling price, the safety stock level of offline service provider and the service devotion in both online and offline channel are discussed. In the following extensive model, platform provider affords part of offline channel service cost at the same time. The optimal price and service devotion between revenue-sharing model and revenue-sharing-cost-sharing model are further compared.
By comparing revenue-sharing model and revenue-sharing-cost-sharing model, it is found that the optimal online direct selling price and offline forward channel service level are affected by revenue sharing ratio and cost sharing ratio while the optimal recycling price and optimal reverse channel service level are only affected by cost sharing ratio. Therefore, in the direct selling complementary closed-loop supply chain system, compared to the business mode that platform provider only shares online selling revenue to channel service provider, revenue-sharing-cost-sharing mechanism balances the service levels in both forward channel and reverse channel and affects the optimal offline recycling pricing strategy. Furthermore, by numerical study it is found that if online platform provider shares part of offline channel service construction devotion, the reverse recycling and reverse channel service level of service provider will increase. From analysis it is revealed that the Internet platform's property of openness, cooperation and sharing promotes the application of dual ratio mechanism design in closed-loop supply chain.
In conclusion, present paper aims to solve the problem that platform provider's online selling mode is not perfect and the hardness of recycling without physical stores. A complementary contract coordination mechanism is designed in which online platform takes charge of direct selling and offline service provider takes charge of dispatching. By comparison of two mechanism, it is found that revenue-sharing-cost-sharing mode is better than the mode without cost-sharing. However, in the practice, the success of such business mode relies on the cooperation among the members in the supply chain. In general, in the beginning, online platform provider and offline channel service provider only share their revenue in the forward channel. With the cooperation time and the trustiness among them increases, they form a strategic alliance in which online platform provider shares part of offline channel service provider's cost devotion to increase the service level of offline service provider. The compensation of online platform provider to offline service provider benefits both of them and allows them to develop the direct selling closed-loop supply chain together.

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