本文构建了一个基于双边减排成本信息不对称的排污权二级交易市场拍卖模型，分析了统一价格、歧视价格及混合拍卖机制下卖方收益、排污权价格波动及排污权供给量差异，在此基础上给出了排污权二级交易市场最优拍卖机制，并进一步讨论了相关参数对最优拍卖机制的影响。结果表明：从收益最大化角度来看，最优的拍卖机制为歧视价格拍卖机制，但考虑到价格波动及排污权供给量等其他因素，排污权二级市场交易应选用混合拍卖机制。风险偏好变化对混合拍卖机制下卖方收益及价格波动的影响存在不确定性，当风险偏好超过某一阈值时，随着风险偏好程度增大，需求隐蔽效应占主导，收益及价格波动增大；相反，当风险偏好小于某一阈值时，随着风险偏好程度增大，竞争效应占主导，收益及价格波动减小。价格变动的供给影响系数对卖方收益的影响随买方参与人数的不同而不同。当买方参与人数较小时，需求隐蔽效应占主导，竞争效应不明显，随着价格变动的供给影响系数增大，混合拍卖机制下卖方的收益不断增加；当买方参与人数较大时，卖方收益同时受到需求隐蔽和竞争效应影响，随着价格变动的供给影响系数增大，收益呈先增大后减小趋势。随着价格变动的供给影响系数增大，价格波动呈先增大后减小趋势。
Using auction to distribute pollution permits can not only internalize exterior problem of environmental pollution, but also adjust the contorted market price. A bilateral cost information asymmetry auction model is built to study the optimal auction mechanism, and the influence of related parameters on the optimal auction mechanism is further discussed. The results show that, the optimal auction mechanism is mixed auction mechanism. When the risk appetite exceeds a certain threshold, the hidden demand effectdominates, as the risk appetite increases, revenue and price volatility increase; when the risk appetite is smaller than a certain threshold, the competition effect dominates, as the risk appetite decreases, revenue and price volatility decrease. When the number of participants is small, hidden demand effect dominates, as the price impact coefficient increases, revenue increase under mixed auction; when the number of participants is large, competition effect dominates, as the price impact coefficient increases, revenue under mixed auctionpresent the inverted U type. As the price impact coefficient increases, the price volatility under mixed auction presents the inverted U type. Theoretical guidance is proviede for emissionpermits auction mechanism design.
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