在供应商批发价格内生、TPL服务增值情形下，研究由供应商、TPL和零售商组成的三级供应链决策与效率评价。基于不同权力结构，构建了TPL和供应商主导的序贯非合作博弈模型，证明了博弈均衡解均存在且唯一。研究表明：两种权力结构下系统利润均出现损失，TPL主导下零售商的订购量、TPL的物流服务水平及二者比值均低于供应商主导的情形，故TPL主导致使供应链运作效率更低。为提高系统运作效率，以TPL的利润结构为出发点，在两种权力结构下均分别引入TPL物流服务费用及成本分摊策略，发现：费用分摊策略下，供应商通过操控批发价格抑制了费用分摊的影响，从而造成策略失效；而成本分摊策略下，当分摊系数满足特定条件时，能够提高两种权力结构下的系统效率以及实现系统帕累托改进。最优的分摊系数仅取决于各权力结构下，无分摊策略时TPL和系统的期望利润。

With the rapid development of the third-party logistics industry, the competitive advantage of the third-party logistics service provider (TPL) is increasingly prominent in terms of operation scale, integration services and information acquisition. This has driven fundamental changes of relevant economic forces in supply chain. How TPL's economic power change affects the decision-making and operation efficiency of upstream and downstream members of the supply chain is a kind of theoretical problem with research significance.Based on above background, this study aims to explore the influence of different power structures on decision-making and operational efficiency in a three-echelon supply chain including a supplier, a TPL provider and a retailer, to seek an effective path of improving system efficiency under each structure.Considering the endogenous wholesale price and the value-added logistics services, we develop two sequential non-cooperative game models are developed when the TPL provider and suppler act as leaders respectively. The game equilibrium solutions in above two models are proved to be exist and unique. Research shows that the total expected profits under two structures are lower than that in centralized setting. The retailer's ordering quantity, TPL's logistics service level and the ratio between them under TPL-led situation are lower than the corresponding results under supplier-led situation. Thus, TPL-led mode results in the lower system operational efficiency. With the TPL's profit structure as the starting point, we introduce logistics service fee sharing and cost sharing strategies into each structure, in order to improve the operational efficiency. Then, it is found that the influence of fee-sharing is suppressed when the supplier could manipulate the wholesale price, which leads to the failure of strategy in both two structures. However, the system operational efficiency can be improved and also the Pareto improvement can be achieved under logistics service cost sharing strategy in both two structures when the sharing coefficient satisfies certain conditions. Moreover, the optimal sharing coefficient depends on the expected profits of TPL and system without sharing strategy in each structure. Finally, a numerical example with the uniform distribution market demand is presented. With model SD and LD as the reference, the impacts of logistics service cost sharing coefficient on the decisions of each member, the expected profits and the system's total expected profits in model SDC and LDC after introducing logistics service cost sharing strategy into the system are mainly analyzed. It is found that:in model SDC and LDC, the optimal logistics service level and ordering quantity may be greater than those in centralized setting; The same sharing strategies do not have the same effects and the retailer need to share more of the cost of logistics service cost in model LDC in order to achieving the same operational efficiency; In SDC and LDC, the efficiency of the system can reach its maximum value at the expense of the retailer's interestwhich is inconsistent with the whole systemoperational efficiency in some cases.The conclusions of this paper provide the theoretical bases for exploring the influence of TPL-led mode on decision-making and efficiency of supply chain members and seeking effective approaches to improveoperational efficiency ofthe three-echelon supply chainwith TPL's participation.