越来越多的供应商面临不确定性中断，它们不知道中断是否以及何时会发生，低估或高估供应的可靠性可能会导致采购过剩或不足。针对具有不确定性供应中断风险的制造商采购问题，构建了一种供应可靠性信号博弈模型，制造商可以从初始不确定型供应商处单源采购，或额外从高成本供应可靠型供应商处双源采购，探究了不同信息条件下信号质量效应、不确定性效应及最优采购策略。研究结果表明，供应中断信息不对称下，制造商需要向高可靠性供应商支付信息租金，防止高可靠性供应商模仿低可靠性供应商。提高信号质量或减少中断的不确定性并不一定对制造商有益，制造商可以通过调整采购策略减少信息不对称的负面影响。此外，当供应商成本差异中度时，较大的市场规模可以对冲信息差对采购策略转换造成的风险。

More and more suppliers are facing uncertain disruptions， and they do not know if and when disruptions will occur. Underestimating or overestimating the supply reliability may lead to over- or under-sourcing. A signaling game model of supply reliability is constructed for the manufacturer sourcing problem with uncertain supply disruptions risk. Manufacturer can source from a single supplier who is initially uncertain， or supplement from a reliable supplier with high cost， forming dual-sourcing. It focuses on signal quality effects， uncertainty effects and optimal sourcing strategies under different information conditions in this paper. The findings suggest that manufacturer needs to pay information rents to high-reliability supplier to prevent it from imitating low-reliability supplier under supply disruptions information asymmetry. Improving signal quality or reducing uncertainty about disruptions is not necessarily beneficial to the manufacturer， who can reduce the negative effects of information asymmetry by adjusting its sourcing strategies. In addition， when the supplier cost differences are moderate， a larger market size can hedge against the risk of switching sourcing strategies due to poor information.