主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2007, Vol. 15 ›› Issue (6): 125-131.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Research on the Long-Term Incentive Mechanism under Executive’s Management of Combined Investment

WU Chong, HU Han-hui   

  1. School of Economics & Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
  • Received:2007-05-24 Revised:2007-11-15 Online:2007-12-31 Published:2007-12-31

Abstract: The investment of developing enterprises is divided into strategic investment and operating investment,the former emphasizes on the long-term performance from exploration of enterprise's strategic chance,the latter cares about the current profit's gain from exploitation of enter prise resources. The traditional incentive mechanism based on the executive's confirmable out put weakened the incentive of executive's strategic investment management,resulted in short-term effect in incentive. So,real options method was used to optimize the above multi-task incentive mechanism. The result suggests that the long-term incentive mechanism based on the judge of strategic chances contributes to the effect of owner's incentive guide, facilitates the executive to make managerial balance between strategic project and operating project.The relativity of two kinds of investment management will exert influences on the design of executive's incentive mechanism,and then determine the proper collocation of two kinds of investment projects'combined managementin enterprises.

Key words: multi-task agent, incentive mechanism, strategic investment, operating investment, realoptions

CLC Number: