Abstract: By introducing the risk preferences of venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist,venture capitalist's intervention action,private benefit of control rights and stage financing,this paper extends and rebuilds the model of Gebhardt-Schmidt (2006) and Jean-Etienne (2008),to analyze the application scopes and influencing factors of the two control structure which are contingent control and joint control. The result of theory research shows that,when entrepreneurs have a high financial constraint,venture capitalist's liquidity constraints and monitoring cost are high;entrepreneur have greater private benefit of control rights;bargaining and redemption power of venture capitalist in re-negotiation is stronger;VC-backed Firms have high liquidation value;venture capitalist's strategic objectives are smaller and risk aversion coefficient is high;and,the joint control is strictly superior to contingent control.

Key words: incomplete co ntract, venture capital-backed firms, control rights, contingent control, joint control