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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2010, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (3): 148-157.

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Contract Stability and Optimization of “Company & Farmer” Mode Bosed on Game Model

TU Guo-ping1,2,3, LENG Bi-bin2,3   

  1. 1. Center for Central China Economic Development Research, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330047, China;
    2. Institute of Systems Engineering, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China;
    3. Department of Management Science and Engineer, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China
  • Received:2009-10-09 Revised:2010-04-19 Online:2010-06-30 Published:2010-06-30

Abstract: In order to explore optimization mode and counterm easures for solving breaking contract problem of "Company&Farmer",the established static game model reveals that the basic reason of the breaking contract problem of "Company&Farmer" is market risk,and the price fluctuation interval of static "Company&Farmer" is obtained.The established contract stability model reveales that the distribution mechanism of "benefit sharing",the reduction of the transaction cost of "Company&Farmer",the strengthening restraint mechanism and the establishment of reputation mechanism are all helpful for stability and development of "Company&Farmer".Simultaneously,futures and options are introduced to optimize "Company&Farmer",and the "Company&Farmer&futures" optimization mode can solve breaking contract risk of company,but not solve breaking contractrisk of farmer;and the "Company&Farmer&options" optimization mode rest rains breaking contract behavior of farmer radically,which can avoid risk of company,lock the company's future profit,and stabilize the source of goods of agricultural product,and also solves the problem of the risk and contract breaking behavior of company.

Key words: “Company&Farmer”, options, game

CLC Number: