Abstract: The paper presents an empirical study based on a database of 752 listed companies from 2005 to 2008 in China.With the method of cash flow portfolio to classify the phases of enter prises.life cycle,this paper investig ates the ultimate controllers.control rights,cash flow rights,the deviation of these two rights and their influence on corporate value.The results show that control rights of ultimate controller have a negative effect on corporate value.However,cash flow rights also have a negative effect,which is different for conclusions of western scholars.This is mainly because of our unique ownership structure,the shares held by major shareholders which are non-tradable shares,which result that high cash flow rights can not play a role in the incentive.The difference of two rights has a negative effect on corporate value in growing stage and maturity stage,while the decline stage is opposite.Comparing with non-state-owned companies,the state-owned companies have a better effect on the corporate value,while the opposite is true in recession.

Key words: control rights, cash flow rights, corporate value, enterprise life cycle