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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (4): 109-114.

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Two Manufacturers and One Retailer’s Shelf-Display-Quantity and Pricing Decision Models and Coordinative Contracts Design

XU Bing   

  1. Department of Management Science and Engineering, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China
  • Received:2008-11-30 Revised:2009-06-16 Online:2009-08-30 Published:2009-08-30

Abstract: Consider a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer,the products produced by two manufacturers are substitutable products,whose demands are functions of the shelf-display-quantity and retail prices. Firstly,retailer's decentralized decisions with profit-maximization are analyzed. Secondly,two centralized decision models are studied for maximizing profits of the whole supply chain system and the allied channel consisting of the retailer and one manufacturer,respectively. Two contracts dependent on retail prices and shelf-display-quantity such as the wholesale price plus subsidy contract and the wholesale price plus subsidy plus profit-share are put forward to coordinate retailer's decentralized decisions consistent with the centralized decisions mentioned above. Finally,the difference of the decision models and the validity of the contracts are shown by a numerical example.

Key words: Shelf-display-quantity, supply chain coordination, decentralized decision, centralized decision contract

CLC Number: