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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (6): 70-77.

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Coordinate Supply Chain via Auction Mechanisms under Procurement with Incomplete Information

MA Jun, ZHANG Jie   

  1. School of Business, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China
  • Received:2009-01-06 Revised:2009-11-22 Online:2009-12-30 Published:2009-12-30

Abstract: This paper examines the problem of supply chain coordination under procurement environment with incomplete information.Auction is not only a price-determination mechanism, it could also serve as a coordination mechanism.Previous works have shown that auction mechanisms could have a significant impact on the players'payoffs and the system efficiency.In this paper, it is studied that how different procurement auction mechanisms influence the players'payoffs, when there are n suppliers and 1 buyer under IPVM settings, and the market inverse demand function is logarithmic.Finally, it is proven that the wholesale price auction and the catalog auction can't realize channel coordination, while only the two-part contract auction with intermediary can achieve channel coordination for the supply chain.

Key words: procurement auction, supply chain coordination, IPV

CLC Number: