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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2008, Vol. 16 ›› Issue (4): 163-169.

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Study on SMEs’ Investment Behavior and Financing Problems Based on Mixed Game Theory

YAN Tai-hua1, WANG Xin2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China;
    2. Chongqing Branch, Bank of Communication, Chongqing 400015, China
  • Received:2007-12-15 Revised:2008-07-25 Online:2008-08-31 Published:2008-08-31

Abstract: This paper analyses the problems of SMEs financing as viewed from scientific investment decision-making of enterprises, discusses the variables influencing SMEs financing under information asymmetry.Based on this, it constructs a standard credit model of banks and SMEs based on mixed game theory, analyses the influence of investment decision-making of enterprises on their financing problems.The result shows: as SMEs make fault investment decisions, deviating from scientific development strategy, they don't achieve Pareto optimum of resources allocation.And the high degree of homogeneity between the owner and manager of SMEs makes this defect more serious.Based on the limitations of SMEs' investment decisions and their inherent defects of corporate governance structure, the authors propose a solution to the current financing problems for SMEs——the establishment of cooperative organizations.

Key words: SMEs, governance structure, investment decision, asymmetric information

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