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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2003, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 83-87.

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Research on Monitoring Mechanism Design of Information Disclosure in Commercial Bank

PENG Xiao-bing, PU Yong-jian   

  1. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
  • Received:2002-11-08 Revised:2003-05-06 Online:2003-06-28 Published:2012-03-06

Abstract: Consummating market economy mechanism and strengthening marketable restriction with commercial banks to increase diaphaneity of banking require a sufficient information disclosure in commercial banks,which is a certain tendency of international banking monitoring According as game theory and information economics,the paper researches 1-stage game and T-stages repeated games of information disclosure monitoring in commercial banks,and it is concluded that a stable game equilibrium will be composed and players will obey the mechanism when information disclosure monitoring mechanism is constructed according to established action rules.

Key words: information disclosure, monitoring, commercial banks, mechanism design

CLC Number: