Abstract: Division of labor and specialization in venture entrepreneur team play a great role in the distribution of the output.This paper,with a Stackelberg game model,analyzes the distribution between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.The entrepreneur devotes capital and endeavor,thus the incentive system in the contract correspondingly includes stock bonus and endeavor profits.The devotion sequence is distinctive,and affects both the output and the belief. Equilibrium devotion and output are improved under the circumstances of the team than that under the mono-agent,due to division of labor.The behavior of free riding is lessened,partly represented as the optimization of the investment.The investor also would like to devote more,and pays more to the entrepreneurs.The founding of team helps to avoid the substitution between the high wage rate and the high stock return.Furthermore,there may exists a kind of risk attitude interplay effect between venture entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.

Key words: venture entrepreneur team, Stackelberg game, venture capitalist, free riding, risk attitude interplay effect