Abstract: A critical problem for transferring R&D(Research and Development)achievements from the party of R&D to the party of obtainment is how to ensure the interest of the former.This paper considers the designment of transference contracts based on game theory and quantitative analysis.We provide three types of contracts which are expressed normally in the quantitative way and are incentive compatible for the target that the party of obtainment performs its obligations willingly.The incentive compatibility of each type of the contracts is demonstrated respectively.The designed contracts are corresponding to three common situations in practice.For two of these situations, we also discuss the designment of the contracts with optimal efficiency for a double target,which is stimulating the party of obtainment to perform its obligations and maximizing the revenue of the party of R&D.The conditions of incentive compatibility with optimal efficiency in each situation are obtained.

Key words: transference contract, designment, performing obligation, incentive compatibility, optimal efficiency