主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2004, Vol. ›› Issue (5): 120-123.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Modeling of Project Managerial Behaviors,Compensation and Enterprise’s Monitoring

KONG Feng, LIU Hong-yan, QI Jian-xun   

  1. Dept of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Baoding 071003, China
  • Received:2003-11-07 Revised:2004-08-16 Online:2004-10-28 Published:2012-03-07

Abstract: Project manager’s speculation behaviors can be relieved by monitoring or incentives.This paper sets up a principal-agent model between a firm and its project manager using game theory.The model is used to analyze managerial speculation behaviors and the relationship between managerial behaviors and firms’monitoring.The concept of firm’s comprehensive monitoring-punishment degree and its critical quantity are put forward.Sug-gestions are given on how to prevent project managers from speculating.

Key words: game theory, project manager, monitoring, incentive compensation

CLC Number: