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主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (3): 115-118.

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The Designing of Executive’s Payment Based on Two-Dimension Relative Performance Evaluation

XU Xi-xiong, WAN Di-fang, LIANG Qiao-zhuan   

  1. The School of Management, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China
  • Received:2004-06-09 Revised:2005-04-13 Online:2005-06-28 Published:2012-03-07

Abstract: The best way to incentive agents is to bind the compensation with their operative performance.We design an executive’s compensation contract based on two-dimension relative performance evaluation,so as to eliminate risk imposed on executives by external systematic circumstance and resource of enterprise.Then we represent a brief discussion about the model and prove its Pareto-efficiency relative to traditional model.

Key words: two-dimension, relative performance evaluation, contract, risk

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