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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2005, Vol. ›› Issue (6): 102-107.

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Comparison on Payment Structure of R&D Contest with Incomplete Information

HAN Jian-jun1,2, TAN De-qing1, GUO Yao-huang1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China;
    2. Henan University of Science and Technology, Luoyang 471039, China
  • Received:2004-12-06 Revised:2005-11-20 Online:2005-12-28 Published:2012-03-07

Abstract: On the side of sponsor,based on game theory,this paper presents an up-front fixed-prize R&D contest model and an auction R&D contest model,compares the sponsor’s total expected income at different payment structure.It is pointed out that:under incomplete information comducting aution will generally reduce the sponsor’s prize expenditure relative to fixed-prize contest.

Key words: R&D contest, incomplete information, payment structure, comparison

CLC Number: