阶段性信息披露和风险资产定价

Abstract

Abstract: The insiders of public company who have more information about the company than other investors should disclose their information to all the investors,and they will disclose their information in the interest of themselves.Different from the early models,we assume the information that the insiders disclosed should be correct and full.In the same time,we assume that the insiders can disclose the information during a certain time period.This paper derived the equilibrium price of risk asset in this setting.

Key words: disclose of information, equilibrium price of risk asset, asymmetric information, JEL classification:(D82 G12)

CLC Number:

WU Wei-xing. Gradual Disclosure and Risky Asset Pricing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, (2): 1-6.

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Gradual Disclosure and Risky Asset Pricing

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