基于演化博弈的区域高耗能产业退出机制研究

Abstract

Abstract: The exit of energy-intensive industry is a kind of basic approach improving the energy efficiency of the regional economic system through industrial restructuring. It is the process of evolutionary game based on local government and related enterprises. In this paper, based on the basic principle of evolutionary game, the regional energy-intensive industry’s exit mechanism is built, typically the factors affecting strategy selection of each game subject are analyzed, the payment function of the main parties involved under different strategies is proposed, the corresponding replicator dynamic equation is established, and evolutionary stable strategy is disussed.

Key words: evolutionary game, replicator dynamic equation, evolutionary stable strategy, energy-intensive industry

CLC Number:

F272

GUO Ben-hai, FANG Zhi-geng, LIU Qing. Study of Regional Energy-Intensive Industry’s Exit Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (4): 79-85.

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Study of Regional Energy-Intensive Industry’s Exit Mechanism Based on Evolutionary Game

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