代理人信息租金抽取的贝叶斯优化与配置效率均衡分析

Abstract

Abstract: The informational impact and information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off with adverse selection in principal-agent problem are researched in the paper. First, the optimal contract with complete information and the second-best contract with incomplete informational anterior probability, both of them are represented based on the comprehensive review of the related literature. Second, the information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off with Bayesian posterior probability is researched, and the constraint of signal procurement cost budget is described. As a result, the Bayesian method is helpful for making the optimal decision on information rent extraction-efficiency trade-off, and designing the incentive contract in practice.

Key words: principal-agent, asymmetric information, adverse selection, contracts, Bayesian rule

CLC Number:

F939

ZHU Jun, GU Wei-dong, SHI Zhi-yuan. The Analysis of Information Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-off with Adverse Selection under Bayesian Rule[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (4): 136-143.

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The Analysis of Information Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-off with Adverse Selection under Bayesian Rule

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