Abstract: As the competition of retail market is becoming increasingly intense, more and more retailers are using the strategy of introducing store-brand (SB) product. First, under a uniformly distributed valuation of national-brand (NB) product accepted by consumers and the retailer-leader Stackelberg game framework, the condition of introducing SB product is obtained in integrated/decentralized/coordinated chain, respectively. Then, the effect of introducing SB product on pricing policies and its related profits is analyzed. Finally, the model is extended to a normal distribution through numerical examples. The result shows that the introduction of SB product can force the manufacturer to reduce NB product's wholesale price and weaken the negative effects of double marginalization caused by making decisions independently, and the retailer always benefits from introducing SB product not only in the decentralized supply chain but also in the coordinated supply chain. However, under a normal distribution, introducing SB product is advantageous for the manufacturer in the decentralized supply chain, and it is adverse for the manufacturer in the coordinated supply chain.

Key words: supply chain, competition, coordination, store-brand product, national-brand product