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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (10): 72-79.

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Selection of the Recovery Channel Based on Recovery Price Competition between the Reverse Supply Chains

FU Xiao-yong1, ZHU Qing-hua2, ZHAO Tie-lin2   

  1. 1. China Center Industrial Security Research Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China;
    2. School of Management, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116023, China
  • Received:2011-07-20 Revised:2014-03-31 Online:2014-10-20 Published:2014-10-20

Abstract: Bosed on the fact that processors will face choosing recovery channels problem in the presence of e-waste recycling market, game model of recycling channels selection by waste electronic products treatment facilities within the context of competition between double chains is established. Through the literature review, four recycling modes in the recycling market are summed up, and the game model of the recycling channels is established under the background of market mechanism. A numerical case is further used to simulate and analyze the game equilibrium outcome. The results are as follows,Firstly, under the mixed mode, the price, quantity and profit of processors selecting direct recovery channels are up to the maximum But if selecting indirect recovery channels,the situation will be on the contrary. In Addition, under the three modes, recovery rates, the number of recovery, profits and reverse supply chain profit of processors are multiplied with the sensitivity coefficient of the consumers.Under the three modes, recovery rates, the number of recovery, profits and reverse supply chain profit of processors are inversely proportional to the recovery competition factor. Finally, under the three modes, processors 1 are gradually increasing, processors 2 profits are gradually reducing. These useful conclusions can provide supports for processors to make decisions.

Key words: reverse supply chain, processor, recycler, competition

CLC Number: