Abstract: The grid corporation is considered to develop potential mitigation space in generation side by using mitigation tournament mechanism. The duopolistic optimal decision models of mitigation competition are constructed based on parameter definition of generators' initial dispatching endowment and mitigation capacity. The equilibrium marginal probabilities of winning and optimal mitigation efforts with different superior generators are determined respectively,and the equilibrium results in these three game structures are comparatively analyzed. Due to losing causes superior generator to suffer a psychological loss and vulnerable generator winning garners an additional psychological benefit,the models are extended to behavioral economics models which take into account social comparison of generator's mitigation decision. The analytical relationships between optimal solutions and behavioral parameters are given. It's found that equilibrium mitigation quantities in the same circumstance are always equal,no matter the number of superior generators in a two-player asymmetric tournament. However,compared with the two cases of homogeneous generators competing,both superior and vulnerable generators will choose to decrease their optimal mitigation levels as the policy response of grid corporation defining generator heterogeneity. The equilibrium mitigation efforts of different types of generators in the generalized models considering psychological factors are greater than the results in the basic models,and respective increment is positively correlated with the value of behavior parameter. The optimal mitigation levels under heterogeneous generators competition are no longer identically equal,and not necessarily less than the equilibrium values in homogeneous circumstances.

Key words: generator heterogeneity, mitigation tournament, marginal probability of winning, effort level, behavioral economics model