效率参数不可观测下的SaaS云外包合约研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.02.003

Abstract

Abstract: There exists moral hazard caused by unobserved efficiency parameter of CSP when customer enterprise is carrying out SaaS(Software as a Service) cloud outsourcing. Focused on this problem, to maximize the expected profit of customer enterprise, the outsourcing incentive mechanism is designed based on incentive mechanism design method to induce CSP to show real information and pay the optimal effort level under the circumstance of service output is the public information,but the efficiency parameter is private information. The conclusions imply that the optimal effort and service payment are the decreasing function of effectiveness parameter; the optimal contract provided by customer enterprise to CSP can be expressed by linear contract; the efficiency parameter is positively related to the payment of the fixed service payment and is negatively related to revenue sharing coefficient in the linear contract which is composed of the fixed service reward and sharing revenue.

Key words: CSP(Cloud Service Provider), efficiency parameter, moral hazard, hidden information, outsourcing contract, mechanism design

CLC Number:

F270.7

TANG Guo-feng, AI Xing-zheng, DAN Bin, LI Dan. Research on SaaS Cloud Outsourcing Contract under Unobserved Efficiency Parameter[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018, 26(2): 25-32.

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Research on SaaS Cloud Outsourcing Contract under Unobserved Efficiency Parameter

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