Abstract: In this paper,according to the characteristics of different sales modes of the online channel, it is divided into online direct sales dual channels,online distribution dual channels and online sales agency dual channels.Here a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is leader and other players (retailer and online retailer) are followers is considered. Unit sales cost of manufacturer in online direct sales dual channels and commission ratio paid by the manufacturer to the agent in online sales agency dual channels are considered. It is essentially different from those presented in previous models in which the channel in controlled by the manufacturer or the traditional retailer.The proposed model is also demonstrated through a series of data sets. It is observed from the numerical study that the manufacturer gains more profits in the e-tail dual-channel and the agency dual-channel than the distribution dual-channel.If the manufacturertries to limit the unit sales cost and the commission ratio in small range. The profit of the manufacturer will decreases with the increase of the commission ratio, while that of the traditional retailer and the agent will increase with the increase of the commission ratio.

Key words: manufacturer, dual-channel, pricing, channel selection