Abstract: The information processing business obtains regenerative information products that support enterprises' decision-making through inspecting and processing information. Due to risk conductivity, not only value but also risks are created in the information processing business. Man-made error is one of the main reasons for risks of information processing business. To reduce the risks, an effective salary incentive mechanism is designed to improve the enthusiasm of employees. The information processing business with two links in series is considered in this paper. The output of the post-order employee is a nonlinear function of the effort level of both the pre-order employee and the post-order employee. Using process modeling technology and principal-agent theory, an incentive model for information processing business under incomplete information is established. The employees' decision-making is to choose the optimal effort level which can achieve the largest net income. The enterprise's decision-making is to set the optimal incentive coefficient so as to maximize its own interest. The salary incentive schemes and the employees' optimal decision under the 9 circumstances are obtained. Example analysis shows that when selecting and deploying employees engaged in the information processing business, enterprises should select employees with higher levels of effort, and arrange the post-order employees with high accuracy rate of inspection.

Key words: information processing, principal-agent theory, salary incentive mechanism