基于效率视角的上市公司股权激励工具选择研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.11.004

Abstract

Abstract: Stock option and restricted stock are treated as two of the most popular equity incentive tools used by listed companies at home and abroad. A large number of literatures have conducted comparative studies on the incentive effects of the two incentive tools from different perspectives, but there are significant differences in the research conclusions. How to choose equity incentive tools for listed companies with heterogeneous characteristics in terms of scale growth and property rights? Existing literature does not provide effective recommendations.
The factors that influence the selection of equity incentive tools in listed companies are revealed from the perspective of incentive efficiency, so as to scientifically address the above question. To be specific, from the perspective of incentive efficiency, the data of China's A-share listed companies that issued the equity incentive plan from 2011 to 2016 are employed to explore the influence of heterogeneous factors such as the scale, growth and the nature of property rights on the selection of equity incentive tools. It is found that company scale can significantly affect the efficiency of equity incentive tools, and large listed companies are more suitable to use stock options, while their small counterparties are fitter for restricted shares. Moreover, the higher the growth degree of the company is, the more significant the influence of the above matching relationship on the equity incentive efficiency will be. Compared with restricted stock, state-owned listed companies are suitable to choose stock option as equity incentive tool.
A mechanism for selecting equity incentive tools of heterogeneous listed companies under the premise of ensuring incentive efficiency is constructed. It provides not only a new perspective and thinking for the existing relevant research, and also direct empirical suggestions for the selection of equity incentive tools for listed companies.

Key words: equity incentive tools, restricted stock, stock options, incentive efficiency, listed companies

CLC Number:

F276.6

LIU Zhong-wen, DUAN Sheng-sen, YU Yi-hao. Research on the Selection of Equity Incentive Tools for Listed Companies Based on Efficiency Perspective[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(11): 31-38.

References

[1] 刘银国,孙慧倩,王烨,等.业绩型股权激励与盈余管理方式选择[J].中国管理科学, 2017,25(3):49-58.
[2] 陈红,郭丹.股权激励计划:工具还是面具?——上市公司股权激励、工具选择与现金股利政策[J].经济管理,2017,39(2):85-99.
[3] Feltham G, Wu M. Incentive efficiency of stock versus options[J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2001,6(1):7-28.
[4] Irving J H, Landsman W R, Lindsey B P. The valuation differences between stock option and restricted stock grants for us firms[J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2011,38(3-4):395-412.
[5] Lim E N K, Mccann B T. The influence of relative values of outside director stock options on firm strategic risk from a multi-agent view[J].Strategic Management Journal 2013,34(13):1568-1590.
[6] 陈其安,沈猛,张红真.股权分置改革过程中非流通股股东对流通股股东的利益侵占行为研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(11):461-469.
[7] 谢德仁,汤晓燕.股利保护、股权激励工具选择与公司现金股利政策[J].投资研究,2014,(2):77-88.
[8] 黄虹,张鸣,柳琳."回购+动态考核"限制性股票激励契约模式研究——基于昆明制药股权激励方案的讨论[J].会计研究,2014,(2):27-33.
[9] 肖淑芳,石琦,王婷,等.上市公司股权激励方式选择偏好——基于激励对象视角的研究[J].会计研究,2016,(6):55-62.
[10] 徐宁.上市公司股权激励模式的选择偏好及动态演化——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南京审计学院学报,2012,(6):41-49.
[11] 刘广生,马悦.中国上市公司实施股权激励的效果[J].中国软科学,2013,(7):110-121.
[12] 王艳,孙培源,杨忠直.经理层过度投资与股权激励的契约模型研究[J].中国管理科学, 2005,13(1):127-131.
[13] Bryan S, Hwang L, Lilien S. CEO stock -based compensation:An empirical analysis of intensity, relative mix, and economic determinants[J].Journal of Business,2000, 73(2):134-146.
[14] Low A. Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2009.92(3):470-490.
[15] 段升森,张玉明.企业规模与成长性:基于非线性视角与我国中小上市公司经验数据[J].中国科技论坛,2011,(10):75-81.
[16] Hall B J, Murphy K J. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options[J].American Economics Review,2000,90(2):209-214.
[17] 沈红波,华凌昊,许基集.国有企业实施员工持股计划的经营绩效:激励相容还是激励不足[J].管理世界,2018,(11):121-133.
[18] 沈传河,王向荣.金融市场联动形态结构的非线性分析[J].管理科学学报,2015, 19(2):66-75.

Research on the Selection of Equity Incentive Tools for Listed Companies Based on Efficiency Perspective

PDF (PC)

Knowledge

Abstract

Cite this article

share this article

References

Related Articles 6

Metrics

Comments

Recommended 0

[1]	Dawen Yan,Cun Li,Guotai Chi. Dynamic Financial Distress Prediction for Chinese Listed Companies Based on the Mixed Frequency Data [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(1): 1-12.
[2]	KONG Feng, ZHANG Wei. On Long-Term Incentive Optimal Combination Model of State-Owned Enterprise Managers Based on Double Reputation [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(9): 133-140.
[3]	MA Jian, LIU Zhi-Xin, ZHANG Li-Jian. Financing Decision in Chinese Listed Companies: A Perspective of Dual Heterogeneous Beliefs [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (2): 50-56.
[4]	CAO Yu, CHEN Xiao-hong, WAN Guang-yu. Study on the Financing Structure of Listed Companies Based on Enterprise Life Cycle [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2009, 17(3): 150-158.
[5]	REN Xia-yi, LIU Xing. A Game Model Description and Anlysis on the Quality of Independent Audit of Chinese Listed Companies [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, (6): 124-130.
[6]	ZHANG De-ming, CAO Xiu-ying, ZHANG Guo-chun. Demonstrative Study on Fabricated Governance Mechanism of China Listed Companies [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2004, (4): 137-143.