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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (12): 43-54.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.12.005

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Cooperative Mechanism of “Double Revenue Sharing” in Product Service Supply Chain

LI Xin, YU Hui   

  1. School of Economics and Business Administration, ChongQing University, Chongqing 400030, China
  • Received:2017-09-23 Revised:2018-06-05 Online:2019-12-20 Published:2019-12-30

Abstract: In the context of "Supply-side Structural Reform", the supply side presents a new transition from a single product to "product + service" package. The product service supply chain aims to improve supply quality level and efficiency through mutual cooperation between upstream and downstream. In practical case, when App Store, an on-line application service website, provides application download services for consumers and meets the consumer market demand through a comprehensive solution of "terminal intelligent product + APP download service", which expand and extend the value chain of corporate. However, in 2017, apple closed the WeChat reward function with the dominant position of the system platform, and further charged other social APP reward function 30% service fee. Thus, when the supply chain value creation and income distribution are separated, the conflict between manufacturers and service provider would be inevitable. Based on the realistic background, the importance of the cooperation mechanism is explored for the supply chain operation efficiency, and the mechanism of the "profit sharing" cooperation mechanism to influence the operation decision is proposed. It provides the operational foundation for the cooperation of product service supply chain under the characteristics of diversified organizational structure. The "non-cooperative" product service supply chain model is constructed, and then the "single or double benefit sharing" method is introduced to discuss the influence of cooperation on supply chain decision-making. Finally, the improvement space of supply chain operation efficiency under different cooperation mechanisms is revealed through mathematical deduction and numerical analysis. When the supplier acts as the leader of the supply chain and participates in the Stackelberg game with the manufacturer, the manufacturer and the service provider use the revenue-sharing contract (the benefit-sharing factor as λ) to perform the revenue distribution, and this is defined as the "single revenue sharing" cooperation mechanism. Similarly, "dual revenue sharing" means that supply and manufacturer consider using a revenue-sharing contract (the benefit-sharing factor as λs&m) to enhance operational collaboration, while manufacturing and service provider still use a revenue-sharing contract to distribute income. This article constructs a product service supply chain cooperation model, which describes the diversity of organizational structure characteristics. The key finding is that there is a "upside down" phenomenon between service scale and supply chain efficiency, and "double revenue sharing" cooperation could improve the supply chain efficiency. Suppliers are motivated to develop high wholesale prices to capture product service supply chain profits under the "single revenue sharing" cooperation. Although the supply chain cooperation mechanism could improve the consumer surplus, but there is a phenomenon of "consumer surplus being eroded" in the "single income sharing" mechanism.

Key words: product service supply chain, cooperation mechanism, “double benefit sharing” cooperation, supply chain efficiency

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