Abstract: With the implementation of the modern urban management community system in China, the community conflicts caused by public facilities are becoming increasingly prominent. Among them, risk set clustering NIMBY eventshave become the main causes of community conflicts. The complexity and random disturbance of the evolution process of NIMBY conflict events require that existing research should not be limited to the analysis of events in a deterministic environment, but should explore the conflict itself in a more real uncertain environment. In view of this, based on evolutionary game theory, Gauss white noise is instroduced to establish the stochastic evolutionary game model of risk set clustering NIMBY conflict events in uncertain environment, so as to compares and analyzes the evolution process of group strategy selection in deterministic system and stochastic system under the scenario of non-government regulation and government regulation by using MATLAB simulation. It is found that (1) in the government non-regulation situation, when the incomes of construction enterprises adopting tough strategy are less than their action costs, and the costs borne by the surrounding people taking protest strategy are more than their incomes, both sides tend to adopt (cooperation, compromise) strategy combination. In addition, in the government non-regulation situation, the speed at which the construction enterprise and the surrounding people's strategy evolved to equilibrium point closely related to its initial strategy selection probability.(2) In the government regulation situation, when the government regulation is greater than the difference of construction enterprises between the profit to adopt a strong strategy and cooperation strategy, and government regulation is greater than the difference between the resistance strategy and the compromise strategy of the surrounding people, (cooperation, compromise) is the only equilibrium point of evolution strategy. In addition, in the government regulation situation, government regulation has a significant impact on the strategic choice of construction enterprises, while has no significant impact on the surrounding people's strategic choice. (3) Random factors interfere with the strategic choice behavior of the construction enterprises and the surrounding people in the risk set clustering NIMBY conflict, but its evolution trend is consistent with deterministic evolution model. The research findings reveal that the legitimate expression of people's interests, the improvement of government regulation mechanism, and the establishment of "flexible" conflict compensation mechanism in enterprises can promote the construction of risk set clustering NIMBY conflicts events governance framework.

Key words: risk set clustering NIMBY conflict, stochastic evolutionary game model, scenario analysis