Abstract: In the context of more original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) authorizes third-party remanufacturers (TPRs) remanufacturing, the remanufacturing licensing impacts on pricing strategies in segmented market is studied. According to the remanufacturer has two pricing strategies which are a high pricing strategy for green consumers and a low pricing strategy for all consumers, a Stackelberg game which is consists of a original manufacturer and a third-party remanufacturer based on recovery constraint are established, solving the optimal decisions under the two kind of pricing strategy. It shows that there is a value interval of remanufacturing license fees. When the remanufacturing license fee is in different intervals, the original manufacturer will force the manufacturer to decide different pricing strategies through the leader position in the closed loop supply chain. Finally, the value interval of remanufacturing licensing fee and the pricing strategy and profit of closed loop supply chain with different license fees are verified by numerical analysis. It is found that: Regardless of the ratio of green consumers, OEM's profits are not the highest when the remanufacturing licensing fee is too high or too low. In addition, for TPR remanufacturing pricing strategy, OEM is more likely to force remanufacturing to choose a pricing strategy with high price and unconstrained output when the remanufacturing licensing fee is higher. In summary, the research results will be helpful to improve the theory of closed-loop supply chain, and have some enlightenment on the pricing of OEM authorizes TPR remanufacturing.

Key words: logistics and supply chain management, remanufacturing pricing, game theory, segmented market, remanufacturing licensing fee