Abstract: Regulatory sandboxes have been implemented in various regions, such as Fangshan District of Beijing, Guiyang of Guizhou Province and Ganzhou of Jiangxi Province,to promote the development of FinTech. In the context of China's vast territory and unbalanced development,what will happen if regulatory sandboxes are launched by local governments? In the game of the regulatory sandboxes between developed and developing areas, will the regulatory sandboxes in developing areas be eliminated, thus regional imbalance is aggravated?To study the above problems,the evolutionary game modelis applied in this paper. Firstly, China's administrative areas are divided into developed and developing ones, and the corresponding local governments are categorized in the same way. Then, the net income models of local governments are constructed by considering such factors as the quantities of FinTech practitioners stationed in the sandboxes, FinTech innovations implemented, potential qualified customers, and the businesses of FinTech innovation, as well as the risk discovery capabilities of the regulatory sandboxes and the average risk management levels of FinTech practitioners in theregulatory sandboxes. Based on the model, evolutionary game analysis of the two groups is performed. Finally, the following conclusions are drawn.First, there is still room to survive for regulatory sandboxes in developing areas. In two of the fifteen cases, implementations of sandboxes is chosen by all local governments in the developing group, while non-implementation of sandboxes is chosen by all those in the developed group. In four cases, implementation of sandboxesis chosen by all local governments in the developed and developing groups. In only one case, implementation of sandboxes is chosen by all local governments in the developing group, while non-implementation of sandboxes is chosen by all local governments in the other group. Second, the final outcomes of local regulation sandboxes are highly dependent on the independent gains and the symbiotic gains. Additionally, the symbiotic gains are also affected by the positive and negative externalities of the counterpart. Therefore, a high degree of dependence exists between the local governments in developed and developing areas, and the final outcome of regulatory sandboxes cannot be decided by either party unilaterally.The conclusions of this paper can be used for reference in the research of the competition of regulatory sandboxes among countries and the arrangements of relevant international coordination mechanism.

Key words: FinTech, regulatory sandbox, local government, evolutionary game