Abstract: With the rapid development of the Internet and the quick popularization of E-commerce, more and more enterprises are involved in the field of fresh e-commerce. At the same time, as the consumption of fresh produce changes and upgrades, some fresh e-commerce companies choose to provide fresh produce as well as value-added service to meet customer demand. Besides, they have in-depth cooperation with suppliers, in which suppliers deliver fresh produce with freshness-keeping. In this context, both high level of freshness-keeping effort and value-added service can increase fresh produce demand. However, in such a fresh e-commerce supply chain, freshness-keeping effort and value-added service are respectively provided by different parties who may have free-rider behavior with relying on the other's effort. In addition, both parties aim to maximize their own profit, which may lead to deviation in the optimal strategies and thereby reduce supply chain performance. To solve this problem, the problem of optimal strategies and coordination of fresh e-commerce supply chain considering fresh-keeping effort and value-added service are studied.
The main work in this paper includes the following four parts. First, the centralized and decentralized game models of fresh e-commerce supply chain considering freshness-keeping effort and value-added service level affecting the market demand of fresh produce are established, and the impacts of the elasticity of freshness and the elasticity of service on optimal strategies are analyzed, and the optimal strategies are compared in both models. Second, a revenue sharing-two way cost sharing contract is designed to achieve the perfect coordination and Pareto improvement of fresh e-commerce supply chain. Third, the changes in optimal strategies before and after coordination are analyzed. Finally, some conclusions are verified through numerical examples.
The results show that, first, under the decentralized decision, with the increase of the elasticity of freshness, the fresh e-commerce always reduces the product price and the level of service, while the fresh supplier faces the choice of whether to improve freshness-keeping effort. When the elasticity of freshness is higher than a certain level, the fresh supplier will reduce freshness-keeping effort. Second, the revenue sharing-two way cost sharing contract can effectively coordinate the fresh e-commerce supply chain and realize Pareto improvement. Third, the product freshness and service level must be improved after supply chain coordination, but it could lead to a lower or higher price of fresh produce. When the elasticity of freshness and the elasticity of service are relatively low, the fresh e-commerce will make a relatively lower product price after coordination, and implement the strategy of "high-quality with low price". However, when the elasticity of freshness or the elasticity of service is higher than a certain level, the fresh e-commerce will make a relatively higher product price after coordination, and implement the strategy of "high-quality with high price".

Key words: freshness-keeping effort, value-added service, fresh produce, e-commerce, supply chain coordination