主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (9): 115-126.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1628

• Articles • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Optimal Quality Effort Strategy in O2O Food Delivery Service Supply Chain Based on Three Operation Models

XING Peng, HE Tian-run   

  1. School of Business, Liaoning University, Shen Yang 110136, China
  • Received:2018-11-14 Revised:2019-05-07 Online:2020-09-20 Published:2020-09-25

Abstract: With the emergence of various PC and mobile platforms, online payment has become more perfect than before, which makes catering takeout have a variety of operating modes. O2O food delivery as a new catering mode in the era of "Internet +" has received more attention from people day by day. Since competition in takeout industry is increasingly intense, how supply chain members avoid vicious competition and choose reasonable service quality effort and operation mode to ensure maximum revenue has become a problem to be solved. To address such decision-making challenges, in this paper, we examine such an O2O food delivery service supply chain including an O2O food delivery platform, a catering business and a distribution rider. O2O food delivery platform decides service quality effort and service cost, the catering business decides product price, while the rider who is motivated by the service quality of the platform or the catering business decides the effort level of the delivery service quality. We consider three operation models, merchant distribution, platform distribution and business self-built platform+ distribution, and explore which model is the best for the catering business. We establish profit models among three members by using game theory, and the optimal quality control strategy and the profit of the supply chain members under different conditions obtained. Using formula derivation and comparative analysis, we discuss the influence of the upper limit of the rider's incentive amount and market scale on the optimal strategies as well as profits of the service supply chain. Through numerical simulation, we can get the conclusions: Firstly, the profits of each member of the service supply chain increase with the rise of the market scale, and firstly increase and then decrease with the improvement of the upper limit of the rider's incentive amount. Secondly, when the market scale is small, the optimal profit of the platform is the largest under the platform delivery mode. However, when the market is large, platform + distribution mode is the best choice for catering business.

Key words: O2O food delivery, service supply chain, quality effort, quality incentive

CLC Number: