Abstract: The market-oriented reform of power-selling power is regarded as the driving engine to promote a new round of power system reform and optimize the allocation of power resources. At this stage, the power market is in the process of smooth transition from the existing pattern to the marketization, and a series of changes have taken place in the participants, functions and industrial organization forms of the power market. After the dynamic reconstruction of the structure of the power market, it is expected to be in a stable development pattern.
Considering above, the Stackelberg game (leader and follower game) is expanded into a two-stage game to describe the two major market behaviors of the seller in the long-term power market after the liberalization of the selling side in China. In the first phase, the seller negotiates with the wholesaler on a bilateral basis. In the second phase, different electric companies compete for market share in the retail market.Finally, the long-term power market equilibrium is solved by reverse induction, and the numerical simulation is used to compare and analyze the long-term and short-term differences, compare the effects of reform, and put forward corresponding policy suggestions.
Research results show that:(1) The equilibrium wholesale electricity price of the long-term power market is lower than the equilibrium wholesale electricity price in the period of total monopoly. (2) In the reform effect, compared with the short-term reform, the competitive long-term reform pattern is more effective. Specifically, the long-term equilibrium electricity price and the equilibrium wholesale electricity price fluctuate less with the discount rate than the short term. (3) At the policy implementation level, with the reform and the increase of competition, the gradual transition of the object of adjustment from electricity wholesalers to electricity sales companies will help to ensure the fairness and efficiency of the market competition in the sale of electricity.
Due to the lack of sufficient long-term experience in electricity market liberalization, there are certain theoretical and practical requirements for designing models to infer possible long-term market development to support decision-making and policy design. By specifying the profit function of the wholesaler and the selling company, the equilibrium electricity price solution can be obtained directly to see the effect of the selling side liberalization policy. Further research can consider more realistic background and include more parameter variables to better simulate the power market situation.

Key words: selling power side release, retail electricity market, long-term industrial organization, electricity price trends, Stackelberggame