Abstract: With the rapid development of remanufacturing industry, the conflicts of interest and intellectual property rights between manufacturers and remanufacturers become more and more prominent. To some extent, patent authorization can effectively reduce property rights disputes and is helpful in solving the interest conflicts issues. In order to explore the parties' evolutionary behaviors and dynamic equilibriums in the patent authorization mode, evolutionary game theory is used to study the decisions between original product manufacturers and third-party remanufacturers, and especially the influence of remanufacturing license fee on system's evolution equilibrium strategies is analyzed. The results show that the system will evolve to different stable equilibrium strategy when the remanufacturing license fee meets different boundary conditions. However, in the pure authorization mode only using remanufacturing license fee, the system can not evolve to the best equilibrium result (green innovation, remanufacturing). Therefore, the government's external intervention is further introduced to the model and the guidence effect of subsidy mechanism is investigated. The results prove that there is a feasible government subsidy mechanism, which can promote the system to achieve the best stable equilibrium. In that case, manufacturers are willing to make efforts in green innovation, thus reducing the remanufacturing costs, and remanufacturers are more willing to carry out remanufacturing business. The joint efforts of both sides will improve the efficiency and value of remanufacturing.

Key words: remanufacturing, reverse logistics, green innovation, evolutionary game, government subsidies