Abstract: In order to promote the development of green building in China,the consumer's utility function, the developer's profit function and the evolutionary game model between government and developer are constructed, analyzing the influence of consumer's green preference, green degree and development cost of the building on the price, demand and profit of green buildings and ordinary buildings, meanwhile, finding out the evolutionary stable strategies of the game system under the four dynamic reward and punishment policies of the government. Finally, a case study of China's green building enterprise is examined with the simulation. The results show that: the increase of consumer's green preference payment coefficient and green degree of the building is conducive to the increase of green building price, demand and profit, but the high cost reduces the demand and profit of green building; there is no evolutionary stable strategy under static subsidy and static taxation,while the system exists evolutionary stable strategies under dynamic subsidy and static taxation,dynamic taxation and static subsidy or dynamic subsidy and dynamic taxation; dynamic subsidy and static taxation is better than other policies in promoting green building development; the probability of developers to develop green building is negatively correlated with the upper bound of subsidy, positively correlated with the ceiling of taxation.

Key words: green building, the mechanism of dynamic reward and punishment, consumer preference, green degree, evolutionary stable strategy