Abstract: It is key to implement the policy of interregional joint prevention and control of air pollution into practice that the overall responsibility for emission reduction is scientifically divided to each member region, and the emission limits for each member region is confirmed reasonably to realize voluntary emission reduction. Based on non-cooperative game theory, the optimal allocation model of the emission rights which satisfy the income constraint and ecological constraint is construted. Then the corresponding Nash equilibrium solution showing the emission limits for each member region is solved for three typical economic relations between regions and the empirical tests are conducted.The conclusion shows that on initial stage of industrialization, the emission limits of the member region is their own non-regulated emissions,without regard to inter-regional transmission. The changing trend of SO2 actual emissions in Gansu and Xinjiang coincides with that. On the stage of the early and middle of industrialization, the emission limits of the central region industrialized firstly is depended on the extreme point satisfying ecological constraint,but can not reach the extreme point satisfying income constraint, the emission limits of the peripheral region is its non-regulated emissions reaching the extreme point satisfying income and ecological constraint which the changing trend of SO2 actual emissions in Sichuan and Chongqing coincides with. On the stage of the late and middle industrialization,the decision on the emission among regions is interacted obviously, the emission limits of all regions is depended on the extreme point satisfying ecological constraint,but can not reach the extreme point satisfying income constraint, and the changing trend of SO2 actual emissions in Hebei and Beijing coincides with that. Further analysis finds that the capacity effect is the pollution source of Hebei and the transmission effect is the pollution source of Beijing,and it is urgent to strengthen the joint prevention and control of air pollution between two places.

Key words: interregional joint prevention and control of air pollution, air pollutant emission right trade, air pollutant emission right initial distribution, non-cooperative game theory