Abstract: The mixed ownership economy has been an important implementation form of China's basic economic system, which was pointed out at the Third Plenary Session of the eighteen. The report of the 19th National Congress further clarified the need to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, develop a mixed ownership economy, and cultivate world-class enterprises with global competitiveness. Moreover, the 2018 government work report also clearly stated that the reform of mixed ownership should be actively and steadily promoted. The introduction of these policy documents provides a clear direction for the development of mixed ownership economy. It also shows that the government's incentive behavior plays an important guiding role in the process of mixed ownership reform. The government as a policy supplier and the non-state-owned capital as a policy responder are important participants in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. In the process of mixed ownership reform, different government incentive models will have different effects on the behavior of non-state capital, and different equilibrium status will occur in the interaction process between government incentive behavior and non-state capital strategy choice.
From the perspective of institutional evolution, the status quo of mixed ownership reform and the practice of pre-reform are taken as the logical starting point, and the subjective game model proposed by Aoki Masahiro is drawnon to analyze the incentive effect of the government's supply behavior and the behavioral logic in strategic choice of non-state-owned capital in the process of mixed ownership reform. Meanwhile, the dynamic evolution process of the influence of the government incentive behavior on the choice of non-state-owned capital strategy under different initial states is simulated through the Matlab software. The research results show that non-state-owned capital participating in the mixed transaction cost of state-owned enterprises, extra income, and government incentive costs will influence the strategy choice of both participating subjects. When the incentive strength of government support is weak, non-state-owned capital will eventually adopt a non-participating strategy. When the incentives supported by the government are strong, "participation" is the optimal strategy for non-state capital.
The conclusions of this paper not only help us to analyze the behavioral motives and behavioral rules of the core stakeholders of policy supply and policy response in the process of mixed ownership reform, but also have important practical significance to the improvement of the efficiency of mixed ownership reform and the optimization of policy supply in the process of mixed ownership reform. In the future, when promoting the development of mixed ownership from the policy level and promoting the synergy between state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital on the basis of their respective comparative advantages, the government should further construct a reasonable policy system, reduce the threshold for entry of non-state-owned capital, and grant non-state-owned capital fair access to entry. Meanwhile, the government should also promote inter-capital restructuring and mergers and improve the property rights trading market, in order to reduce the transaction costs and barriers to entry of the participants in the mixed ownership reform.

Key words: mixed ownership reform, government, non-state capital, subjective game