Abstract: As an indispensable part of the international trade logistics system, maritime supply chain playsa positive role in promoting trade globalization. Under the background of global energy shortage, environmental capacity decline, carbon tax policy and customers green preference,the development of maritime supply chain is facing the challenges of energy and environment.Port and shipping companies will inevitably follow the principle of sustainable development to seek benign development. Aiming at the problem of joint carbon emission reduction between ports and shipping companies, a linkage model of static Stackelberg equilibrium and dynamic evolutionary game is constructed. Under the influence of government carbon emission regulation and carbon trading market, the research considers sustainable development of low-carbon technology investment strategies in the maritime supply chain. It shows that with the increase in the proportion of investment cost sharing, under the static Stackelberg equilibrium, the willingness of shipping companies to invest gradually decreases, but the port always prefers to invest by itself. In this condition, the system equilibrium strategy changes from the prisoner’s dilemma of shipping companies’ investment to the pareto optimum of port investment.Under the dynamic evolutionary game, the stable result is that the investment is transform from shipping companies to port. In addition, from the perspective of the government-market-enterprise tripartite, it is found that: (1) There is no relation between the low-carbon investment of companies and the government carbon emission quota; (2) Companies need to pay attention to carbon trading market prices, shippers’ sensitivity to sustainability levels, and price sensitivity, whose increase will result in carbon emissions’ reduction; (3) With the increase in the share ratio, carbon emissions will show an upward trend. Finally, combining static and dynamic investment strategies, it can be seen that the dynamic game strategy of maritime supply chain is consistent with the static equilibrium strategy. Because in long-term investment, maritime supply chain companies consider the strategies that are beneficial to both parties, rather than for themselves. On this basis, suggestions on sustainable investment are put forward from three angles of government, port and shipping companies.

Key words: sustainability investment; maritime supply chain; Stackelberg model; evolutionary game