Abstract: The realization of appointment registration and intelligent triage on Wechat, Alipay and other mobile apps is essentially the optimization of information platform. The optimization of information platform may cause unreasonable increase of medical expenses. By analyzing the influence of information platform optimization input on patients’ choice, a medical service system considering information platform optimization is constructed. Different from previous studies, the expected waiting time in the system is more accurate waiting time in the waiting queue. In addition, the optimization decision variable of service provider innovatively changes from medical service capability to input of information platform optimization, and the decision goal of capital provider is to minimize social medical cost. The equilibrium strategy and the properties of equilibrium state of medical service system are studied. The equilibrium state of medical service system with different medical service scale is compared. It is found that for the public medical system, the optimal input of information platform optimization is uncorrelated with the patient co-payment rate, which is helpful to realize the equalization of basic medical services. Secondly, it is mathematically proved that in equilibrium, when patients’ medical needs increase, the budget allocated to public hospitals will decrease. Finally, the patient co-payment rate is not related to the complexity of medical services, that is, the medical costs borne by patients are not related to the complexity of medical services. These management insights will help public hospital managers to better optimize the medical information platform, and also help the government to make more reasonable decisions to prevent the unreasonable increase of medical costs.

Key words: information platform optimizing; waiting time of wait queue; queuing game; public medical budget; patient co-payment rate