Abstract:

Considering the influence of manufacturer's overconfidence behavior and retailer's corporate social responsibility（CSR） behavior on channel member's return strategy， a Stackelberg game model dominated by manufacturer is constructed. Firstly， the retailer's full refund return policy is analyzed， and the equilibrium solution under decentralized decision and centralized decision is obtained by game theory， and the coordination of revenue sharing and cost sharing combination contract is verified. Then the model is extended to analyze the retailer's partial refund return policy and the manufacturer's return policy. Finally through comparative analysis and numerical analysis， the following conclusions are drawn： （1）the effect of overconfidence on supply chain depends on the coefficient of overconfidence on return rate. When the coefficient is small， the impact of this irrational behavior is positive， but when the coefficient is large， this behavior has a negative impact on the manufacturer's utility. （2）The retailer’s CSR is beneficial to the supply chain， and can alleviate the negative impact of overconfidence. （3）Compared with the retailer's full refund return policy， the retailer's partial refund return policy will damage consumer surplus， but it is beneficial to channel members. Whether the manufacturer provides a return policy depends on the size of the product residual value， when the product residual value is high， the manufacturer's return policy is optimal.

Key words: overconfidence, corporate social responsibility, consumer surplus, return policy